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ABSTRACT 
This Article scrutinizes varying interpretive methodologies 
used by different tribunals of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) in relation to Article 
XI of the US-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), which, 
in different degrees, had referred to the customary doctrine of 
“necessity” to derive Article XI’s substantive meaning and legal 
effects.  Neither Sempra v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, CMS Gas v. 
Argentina, nor most recently in 2008, Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Argentina, evince a demonstrably adequate interpretive 
methodology within the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).  Accordingly, 
this Article proposes a return to these fundamental rules of treaty 
interpretation.  Given conceptual and methodological 
incompatibilities between the customary doctrine of “necessity” 
and Article XI, this Article holds that the customary doctrine has 
no interpretive utility for Article XI.  Rather, treaty appliers of 
Article XI (and other similarly-worded treaty clauses on non-
precluded measures) should abide by the components of the 
unitary system of interpretation under the VCLT, particularly the 
treaty text and context. A State invoking an Article XI-type Non-
Precluded Measure (“NPM”) utilizes Article XI to address 
potential international responsibility vis-a-vis the other State Party 
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to the BIT, and cannot use Article XI to remove its lex specialis 
substantive duties under the BIT to that State Party’s investors.  
Finally, this Article recommends that treaty appliers should 
privilege a holistic reading of the lex specialis as the governing law 
whenever the host State claims an economic emergency to plead 
outright exculpation from substantive obligations in bilateral 
investment treaties. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
All interpretation pursues meaning within a penumbra of 
discursive formations.1  With respect to the interpretation of 
treaties, modern international law has substantially settled its 
interpretive rules and accepted methodology through the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Due to the VCLT’s 
modalities of interpretation, treaty appliers do not have an 
unlimited universe of sources, texts, symbols, and significations 
from which to elicit the meaning intended by State parties to a 
treaty.  Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides the definitive general 
formulation for treaty interpretation to be “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”2  Context, according to Article 31(2) of the VCLT, can be 
composed of: (1) “the text [of the treaty], including its preamble 
and annexes;” (2) “any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty;” and (3) “any instrument which was made by one or 
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.”3  Other phenomena that may be taken into account 
together with context include: (1) “any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions;” (2) “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation;” and (3) “any relevant rules of 
 
1 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 23–70 (A.M. 
Sheridan Smith trans.) (1972); see also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 285–392 (2008) 
(evaluating the conceptual aspects of interpretation). 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
3 Id. art. 31(2). 
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international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”4 
If it is established that the parties intended so, a special meaning 
will be given to a term.5  Article 31 of the VCLT has thus been 
understood to refer to a unitary system or rule of interpretation, 
such that those undertaking the task of treaty interpretation must 
collectively consider “the text, its context, and the object and 
purpose of the treaty.”6  As the International Law Commission 
(“ILC”) stressed, Article 27 of the Draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties (now Article 31 of the VCLT) makes text, context, 
subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subsequent 
practice establishing the understanding of the parties regarding the 
interpretation, and relevant rules of international law, as being all 
“of an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be 
considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to 
those which precede them [in the logical progression of Article 
27].”7 
On the other hand, Article 32 of the VCLT permits 
supplementary means of interpretation for two alternative 
purposes: (1) to confirm the meaning resulting from the application 
of Article 31; or (2) to determine meaning when the Article 31 
interpretation “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” or 
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”8  
Supplementary means include, but are not limited to, the travaux 
preparatoires and the “circumstances of its conclusion.”  The travaux 
preparatoires is generally “understood to include written material, 
such as successive drafts of the treaty, conference records, 
explanatory statements by an expert consultant at a codification 
conference, uncontested interpretative statements by the chairman 
of a drafting committee and ILC Commentaries,” whose value 
depends on several factors, particularly “authenticity, 
completeness and availability.”9  Other “supplementary” 
techniques of treaty interpretation are based on domestic legal 
orders’ principles on statutory construction (e.g. ejusdem generis, 
 
4 Id. art. 31(3). 
5 Id. art. 31(4). 
6 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 234 (2d ed. 2007). 
7 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 220, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/190 
[hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties]. 
8 Vienna Convention, supra note 2 art. 32. 
9 AUST, supra note 6, at 246. 
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expression unius est exclusio alterius, lex posterior derogat legi priori, lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, to name a few).10  Clearly, Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT both provide reasonable delineations for a 
treaty applier.  The International Court of Justice has declared both 
of these norms as likewise bearing the status of customary 
international law.11 
Despite the relative clarity of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, 
however, treaty appliers’ liberal methodologies could still subvert 
the unitary system of treaty interpretation.12  In the September 5, 
2008 Award in Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina,13 the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Tribunal 
had occasion to again interpret Article XI of the Treaty Between the 
United States and Argentina concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (“U.S.-Argentina 
BIT”).  Article XI, in its entirety, states: “This Treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests.”14  
Argentina invoked Article XI, specifically its “essential security 
 
10 JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38–39 (1996). 
11 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 645 (Dec. 17). 
12 See Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 358–59 (2008):  
While it has been argued convincingly that ‘the dispute resolution 
system devised by [the international] society must make available both 
centralized and decentralized mechanisms for attending to the social 
needs of [the] evolving structure [of the international society]’, it is the 
opinion of this author that international tribunals’ approaches to 
interpretive issues should to a significant degree be ‘centralized’.  The 
way in which ICSID tribunals use interpretive arguments in practice is often 
quite far removed from the structures set out in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT.  
Id.  (emphasis added). 
13 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (Sep. 5, 2008).  See 
also Damon Vis-Dunbar, Continental Casualty Company moves to annul award 
favourable to Argentina, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009, 
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009 
/01/16/continental-casualty-company-moves-to-annul-award-favourable-to-
argentina.aspx (explaining that the tribunal held that Argentina had successfully 
applied the essential security provision found in the U.S.-Argentina BIT). 
14 Treaty Between United States of America and Argentina Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment [hereinafter U.S.-
Argentina BIT], art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124. 
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interests,” to deny liability for a series of legislated economic 
measures imposed during the Argentine financial crisis from 2000–
2002 (the “Capital Control Regime”), that had unilaterally pesified 
(converted to pesos) formerly dollar-denominated contracts, frozen 
bank deposits and prohibited the transfer of funds abroad, 
terminated peso convertibility and pegged the U.S. dollar at a fixed 
one-to-one exchange rate, rescheduled term deposits and reduced 
interest rates, and defaulted on and unilaterally rescheduled 
government debt.  In interpreting the scope of “essential security 
interests,” the Tribunal in Continental declared that it would not 
use the customary law doctrine of necessity, as codified in Article 
25 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility.  Instead, the Tribunal explored GATT and WTO 
case law to determine the scope of “essential security interests” as 
contemplated in the U.S.-Argentina BIT: 
For the reasons stated above relating to the different role of 
Art. XI and of the defense of necessity in customary 
international law, the Tribunal does not share the opinion 
that “the treaty thus becomes inseparable from the 
customary law standard insofar as to the conditions for the 
operation of the state of necessity are concerned,” as stated 
in the Enron Case and submitted also by the Claimant.  
Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model 
clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties in turn 
reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the 
Tribunal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and 
WTO case law which has extensively dealt with the concept 
and requirements of necessity in the context of economic 
measures derogating to the obligations contained in GATT, 
rather than to refer to the requirement of necessity under 
customary international law. 15 
Despite the foregoing declaration, the Tribunal’s reasoning in 
Continental ultimately used the concept of necessity under 
customary international law as a supplementary means of 
interpreting Article XI.  Apart from this supplementary reference, 
the Tribunal also uniquely expanded the sources of possible 
interpretation of Article XI to import doctrines from completely 
distinct legal regimes such as the GATT and the WTO.  
 
15 Cont’l Cas. Co., para. 192. 
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Inexplicably, the Tribunal as treaty applier broadened its reach of 
interpretive sources in a manner seemingly inconsistent with the 
clear delimitations prescribed in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. 
The Tribunal’s construction of “essential security interests” 
within the framework of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT sets a 
troubling precedent for the interpretation of analogously-worded 
provisions on NPM in other bilateral investment treaties.  
According to a recent survey, NPMs are present in over two 
hundred bilateral investment treaties.16 
Considering the increasing proliferation of similarly-worded 
NPMs in investment treaty regimes, treaty appliers are challenged 
to construe a lex specialis treaty term—”essential security 
interests”—with utmost fidelity to the settled interpretive rules in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.  As this Article shows, there are 
conceptual and methodological problems in using the customary 
norm of necessity as a supplementary means of interpreting the lex 
specialis treaty term of “essential security interests,” whether to 
confirm a meaning reached under the system of interpretation in 
Article 31 of the VCLT, or to itself provide basis to determine treaty 
meaning permitted in Article 32 of the VCLT.  Conceptually, the 
content of “necessity” as a norm precluding wrongfulness under 
customary international law vastly differs from the content of 
“essential security interests” as lex specialis in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  The legal consequences flowing from each type of 
norm, (and as corollaries, the duties assumed by the host State 
under each norm), are also separate and distinct.  
Methodologically, “necessity” under customary international law 
also envisions a more restrictive range of state action than 
“essential security interests” in the lex specialis of Article XI.  The 
inherent incompatibility between the customary law doctrine of 
 
16 William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L. L. 307, 318–20 (2008) 
(detailing the presence of non-precluded measures in bilateral investment 
treaties).  NPMs have also been built into multilateral treaty regimes.  For 
example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Framework 
Agreement on Investment Area, Member States are not prevented from adopting 
or enforcing measures “necessary to protect national security and public morals,” 
or to take “necessary safeguard measures” when a Member State “suffers or is 
threatened with any serious injury or threat,” which is the “result of the 
implementation of the liberalization programme under this Agreement.”  
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area arts. 13, 14, Oct. 7, 1998,  
http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf. 
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“necessity” and “essential security interests” in the lex specialis of 
Article XI ought to militate against any use of “necessity” as a 
supplementary means of interpretation of non-precluded measures 
in bilateral investment treaties.  The interpretive havoc wrought by 
using “necessity” as a supplementary means of interpretation to lex 
specialis NPMs thus poses serious policy consequences for the 
stability of the international legal investment regime, and raises 
serious moral hazards that incentivizes higher-risk economic and 
investment policy-setting by host States. 
Dissociating Article XI from the customary norm of necessity, 
however, does not reduce Article XI to a non liquet situation of 
norm-inoperability.  Instead, the brief text of Article XI should be 
contextually viewed from its limited understanding within the 
framework of the international obligations subsisting between the 
states parties to the BIT.  Given the text of Article XI in relation to 
the structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, this analysis 
proposes an interpretive bifurcation of the duties of a host State 
vis-a-vis investors under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, from the 
international obligations that give rise to state responsibility 
between the United States and Argentina as treaty parties.17  A 
State invoking an Article XI-type NPM utilizes Article XI to 
address potential international responsibility vis-a-vis the other 
State Party to the BIT, and cannot use Article XI to remove its lex 
specialis substantive duties under the BIT to that State Party’s 
investors.  This crucial point of differentiation should result in a 
better-nuanced appreciation of international legal consequences in 
an Article XI-type situation (e.g. when a host State asserts that it is 
“not precluded from taking a measure necessary to ‘essential 
security interests’”) that does not violate the unitary system of 
interpretation under the VCLT. 
Section 1 of this Article scrutinizes the methodology and 
reasoning employed in various ICSID decisions on the 
 
17 See MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF TREATIES ON 
GROUNDS OF BREACH 62–65 (1996). 
International responsibility is independent of the reaction a wronged 
party may take.  Even if that party decides to waive its right to react to 
the wrongful act for any reason, the defaulting party is not relieved from 
its responsibility. . . . The injured party has to be one to whom an 
international obligation arising from the treaty is due.  If not, it may not 
bring a claim in respect of the breach. 
Id.  
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interpretation of “essential security interests” of Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, culminating with the latest September 5, 2008 
Award in Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina.  A comparative examination 
of the interpretive methodologies reached in these decisions by 
separate ICSID Tribunals shows that “essential security interests” 
have been parsed within an entire spectrum of meanings, from the 
most restrictive to the most expansive reading in Continental.  
Section 2 then examines conceptual and methodological problems 
arising within the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
when the customary norm of necessity is used as a 
“supplementary” means of interpreting the lex specialis of Article XI 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, more so in the context of the Continental 
award.  Section 3 sets forth a distinct choice of law proposal for 
future cases, favoring exclusive use of the lex specialis and 
abandoning the confusing “supplementary” use of necessity under 
customary international law to explicate the meaning of “essential 
security interests,” except in the circumscribed instance that the 
parties to a treaty textually provide the customary norm to be a 
“relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties” within the contemplation of Article 31(3) of 
the VCLT.  This deliberate choice of law in favor of the lex specialis 
should more predictably affect how future Tribunals appreciate the 
duties of the host State; assess the standards of reasonability, 
proportionality, fair and equitable treatment; exact the quantum of 
evidence to prove the existence of a situation warranting non-
precluded measures under the lex specialis; and evaluate the host 
State’s subsequent conduct in situations of possible mitigation 
and/or contribution to situations implicating “essential security 
interests.”  To complete interpretive scrutiny of Article XI, Section 
3 also proposes a reading of Article XI that reconciles the expressed 
intent of the States Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT within the 
structure, policy, and design of the treaty.  In the Conclusion, this 
Article outlines various inimical policy consequences from using 
the customary norm of “necessity” as a supplementary means of 
interpretation of lex specialis non-precluded measures, including 
threats to the rule of law and the reciprocity of stable expectations 
between host States and investors, increased volatility in the 
international legal regime for investment, and provoking moral 
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hazards that incentivize higher-risk economic policy-setting of host 
States.18 
2. “ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS” IN ARTICLE XI OF THE U.S.-
ARGENTINA BIT VIS-A-VIS THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DOCTRINE OF “NECESSITY” IN ICSID JURISPRUDENCE: FROM SEMPRA, 
CMS GAS, LG&E TO CONTINENTAL 
Prior to Continental, no ICSID Tribunal had ever treated the 
2001–2002 Argentine financial crisis, and the measures undertaken 
by the Argentine government during this period, as a legitimate 
basis to claim exculpation from liability to a broad range of foreign 
investors.19  As will be shown in this section, Continental would not 
just be a singular triumph for Argentina, but it would also mark a 
deliberate departure from the interpretive practice of previous 
ICSID Tribunals in three cases likewise involving the same plea of 
economic emergency: (1) Sempra Energy International v. Argentina;20 
(2) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina;21 and (3) LG&E 
Energy Corporation v. Argentina.22  Before proceeding to a 
comparative analysis with the Tribunal’s latest interpretive 
methodology in Continental, the following subsections briefly 
discuss the relevant facts and legal reasoning for each of these 
three cases. 
 
18 See William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1869 (2000) (expounding upon the dangers inherent in the reliance upon 
economic emergency powers as a basis for regulation). 
19 See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability 
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 199 (2008) (presenting an argument on the position that the ICSID 
Tribunals’ narrow interpretation of Article XI has made the latter “essentially 
unavailable to any state,” prior to Continental). 
20 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (May 11, 2005); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
21 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (July 17, 2003); CMS Gas Transmission 
Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 11, 2005); CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Request for Stay of Enforcement of 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 1, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentina, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment 
of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
22 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Apr. 30, 2004); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, 
Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006); LG&E Energy 
Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (July 25, 2007). 
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1.1. Sempra 
Sempra Energy International, a company established in 
California, brought suit against Argentina as a 43.09% shareholder 
of two companies (Sodigas Sur S.A. and Sodigas Pampeana S.A.), 
with another company, Camuzzi, owning the remaining 56.91% of 
shares in both companies.  These two companies in turn owned the 
majority shares in two Argentine natural gas distribution 
companies (Sodigas Sur S.A. held 90% of shares in Camuzzi Gas 
del Sur S.A., while Sodigas Pampeana held 86.09% of shares in 
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A.).23  Both natural gas distribution 
companies held licenses from Argentina to supply and distribute 
natural gas in seven provinces in Argentina. 
Argentina raised the following objections: (1) there was no 
legal dispute; (2) the measures in question were not directly related 
to an investment; (3) no national of another contracting State to the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT was directly harmed; (4) the claim is 
premature; (5) Sempra had no jus standi as it was not qualified to 
bring suit as a mere minority shareholder in Sodigas Sur and 
Sodigas Pampinea; and (6) the dispute had already been submitted 
to other tribunals. 
Applying only the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention and the U.S.-Argentina BIT in order to reach a 
determination on jurisdiction, the Tribunal rejected each of 
Argentina’s objections.  The Tribunal held that Sempra could 
submit a claim as a national of the U.S., insofar as it meets the 
requirements laid down in the ICSID Convention and the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  Sodigas also had the option “to complain as a 
company incorporated in Argentina, if it is established that this 
company is under foreign control, and through it, the licensee 
companies too.”24  The Tribunal clarified that the second sentence 
of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention,25 as well as Article VII(8) of 
 
23 Sempra Energy Int’l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 19. 
24 Id. para. 42. 
25 The Tribunal explained that “Nationals of another Contracting State” 
means: 
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State 
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties 
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any 
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party 
to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the 
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the U.S.-Argentina BIT,26 merely “provides an additional or 
different alternative which does not in this case prevent an investor 
from opting to act under the first sentence of the Convention article 
if it meets the pertinent requirements.”27  Even if the second 
sentence were to be applied, Sempra would still have the requisite 
nationality to bring suit, since, as the Tribunal noted, both Sempra 
and Camuzzi exercised joint control and management of Sodigas 
Sur and Sodigas Pampinea pursuant to their respective 
shareholders’ agreements and company by-laws.28 
The Tribunal further held that there was a legal dispute which 
arose directly from Sempra’s investment.  The Tribunal adopted 
the standard in the Gami case29 to conclude that the extent that the 
treaty on which the protection or guarantee is based provides the 
shareholder with the possibility to resort to arbitration, where 
direct or indirect ownership is considered and a broad definition of 
investment is made under Article I(1)(a) of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.30  The Tribunal characterized Sempra’s claim as founded on 
 
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for purposes of this Convention. 
ICSID Conventions Rules and Regulations, art. 25 ¶ 2. 
26 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. 7, ¶8. 
For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any 
company legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations 
of a Party or a political subdivision thereof but that, immediately before 
the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the dispute, was an 
investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, shall be treated 
as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 
25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. 
Id. 
27 Sempra Energy Int’l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 45. 
28 Id. paras. 54–57. 
29 GAMI Invs. Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award (Nov. 15, 2004), 13 ICSID (W. 
Bank) 147. 
30 1. For purposes of this Treaty, 
(a) ‘investment’ means every kind of investment in the territory of one 
Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or 
companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and 
investment contracts, and includes without limitation 
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, 
liens and pledges; 
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in 
the assets thereof; 
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both contract and the U.S.-Argentina BIT, holding that the dispute 
“arises from how the violation of the contractual commitments 
with the licensees, expressed in the license and other acts, impacts 
the rights the investor claims to have in the light of the provisions 
of the Treaty and the guarantees on the basis of which it made the 
protected investment.”31 
Finally, the Tribunal disposed of the other objections to 
jurisdiction by holding that: (1) the pendency of renegotiation 
proceedings between Argentina and its foreign investors was not a 
basis for deferment of the arbitration; (2) the determination and 
quantification of losses is an issue for the merits phase of the 
arbitration; (3) Sempra’s evidence shows that it is a foreign 
investor; and (4) the pendency of disputes before national courts 
would not prevent the Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over 
claims arising from alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
Significantly, in ascertaining whether Argentina had expressed its 
consent to submit to arbitration under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the 
Tribunal affirmed Article 31 of the VCLT as the “principal means 
of interpretation” of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, describing the U.S.-
Argentina BIT as having been concluded by the parties in order to 
provide “full protection to investors.” 32 
The Tribunal’s Award in the Merits phase on September 9, 
200733 was issued in Sempra’s favor.  The Tribunal  concluded that 
Argentina had breached its obligations to accord the investor fair 
and equitable treatment guaranteed under Article II(2)(a) of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT and to observe the obligations entered into 
with regard to the investment as guaranteed in Article II(2)(c) of 
 
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value 
and directly related to an investment; 
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: 
literary and artistic works, including sound recordings, inventions in all 
fields of human endeavour, industrial designs, semiconductor mask 
works, trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business information, 
and trademarks, service marks, and trade names; and 
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits 
pursuant to law.   
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
31 Sempra Energy Int’l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, para. 100. 
32 Id. para. 142. 
33 Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/4
2010] NON-PRECLUDED MEASURES IN BITs 839 
 
the same treaty.  It ordered Argentina to pay Sempra compensation 
in the amount of $128,250,462 (USD), with semi-annually 
compounded interest at the six month successive LIBOR rate plus 
two percent for each year, from January 1, 2002 until the date of the 
Award. 
Sempra had argued that various measures undertaken by the 
Argentine government from 2000 to 2002 abrogated and 
repudiated most of the rights Sempra had under the regulatory 
framework and the terms of the licenses issued to Camuzzi Gas 
Pampeana and Camuzzi Gas del Sur.  Sempra’s decision to invest 
in these companies relied specifically on the conditions offered by 
such legislative and regulatory enactments, which included 
conditions that: (1) licenses would be for a term of thirty-five years, 
with a possible ten-year extension; (2) calculation of tariffs would 
be made in U.S. dollars and their semi-annual adjustment would 
be made according to changes in the U.S. Producer Price Index 
(“PPI”); (3) there would be no price freeze applicable to the tariff 
system, and if one was imposed, the licensee had the right to 
compensation; (4) the license would not be amended by the 
Argentine government, without the prior consent of the licensee; 
(5) the Argentine government committed not to withdraw the 
license except in case of specific breaches; and (6) the principle of 
indifference would operate with respect to subsidies granted by 
the Argentine government so that the distributor’s income would 
not be altered.34 
Argentina argued its defense of emergency from three separate 
legal streams: (1) Argentine law and jurisprudence which 
supposedly contemplates the rebalancing of contracts during a 
state of economic emergency; (2) general international law which 
includes the customary norm on the state of necessity as codified 
under Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility; and (3) Articles IV(3) and XI of the 
US-Argentina BIT.35 
The Tribunal initially examined the allegations of breach of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.  The Tribunal held that Argentina’s measures 
did not breach Article IV(1) (no expropriation);36 Article II(2)(b) (no 
arbitrariness or discrimination);37 and Article II(2)(a) (there being 
 
34 Id. paras. 85, 93. 
35 Id. paras. 98, 338, 356. 
36 Id. para. 286. 
37 Id. paras. 311–14. 
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no specific allegation of failure to provide full protection and 
security to the investment).38  However, the Tribunal held that 
Argentina’s emergency measures breached Article II(2)(a) by 
failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors, 
reasoning that: 
The measures in question in this case have beyond any 
doubt substantially changed the legal and business 
framework under which the investment was decided and 
implemented.  Where there was business certainty and 
stability, there is now the opposite.  The tariff regime 
speaks for itself in this respect.  A long-term business 
outlook has been transformed into a day-to-day discussion 
about what is next to come.  The guarantees given are no 
longer available.39 
The violation of this specific treaty obligation also triggered a 
breach of the umbrella clause in Article II(2)(c) of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.40 
The Tribunal then proceeded to consider, and in turn reject, the 
defense of emergency as asserted by Argentina from the 
standpoint of Argentine law and jurisprudence, general 
international law, and the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  With respect to 
Argentine law, the Tribunal adopted the standard that emergency 
restrictions on the normal exercise of patrimonial rights must be 
“reasonable, limited in time, and constitute a remedy and not a 
mutation in the substance or essence of the right acquired by 
judicial decision or contract.”41  Argentina’s emergency measures 
failed to meet the temporality requirement when it extended the 
emergency legislation beyond the period of the financial crisis.42  
The emergency measures also caused an essential mutation of the 
rights under the licenses, to the point that “in reality . . . the rights 
granted under the License shall be permanently eliminated, at least 
insofar as the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and their PPI 
adjustment are concerned.”  According to the Tribunal, this result 
 
38 Id. paras. 321–24. 
39 Id. para. 303 (citation omitted). 
40 Id. paras. 311–14. 
41 Id. para. 247. 
42 Id. paras. 251–52. 
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could not be permitted, since the “natural outcome of the operation 
of ‘emergency’ is not . . . a legal exemption from liability.”43 
Finally, Argentina’s unilateral determination of tariff 
adjustments, undertaken outside the adjustment mechanisms 
provided under the terms of the licenses themselves, proved 
Argentina’s measures to be inconsistent with the requirement of 
reasonableness.44  In the words of the Tribunal: 
[T]he real issue in the instant case is whether the 
constitutional order and the survival of the State were 
imperiled by the crises, or instead whether the Government 
still had many tools at its disposal to cope with the 
situation.  The Tribunal believes that the constitutional 
order was not on the verge of collapse as evidenced by, 
among many examples, the orderly constitutional transition 
that carried the country through five different Presidencies 
in a few days’ time, followed by elections and the 
reestablishment of public order.  Even if emergency 
legislation became necessary in this context, legitimately 
acquired rights could still have been accommodated by 
means of temporary measures and renegotiation.45 
The Tribunal also rejected the defense of necessity under 
customary international law (reflected by Article 25 of the Articles 
of State Responsibility), questioning the alleged existence of a 
grave and imminent peril that could threaten the essential interest.  
According to the Tribunal, while there was “no doubt that there 
was a severe crisis, and that, in such a context, it was unlikely that 
business could have continued as usual,” the argument that: 
[S]uch a situation compromised the very existence of the 
State and its independence, and thereby qualified as one 
involving an essential State interest, is not convincing.  
Questions of public order and social unrest could have been 
handled, as in fact they were, just as questions of political 
stabilization were handled under the constitutional 
arrangements in force.46 
 
43 Id. para. 254. 
44 Id. paras. 255–61. 
45 Id. para. 332. 
46 Id. para. 348. 
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The Tribunal was careful to point out that it was not its task to 
substitute its view of what the Argentine government’s choice 
ought to have been among various economic options, but that for 
purposes of Article 25, the Tribunal’s duty is “only to determine 
whether the choice made was the only one available.”47 
Turning to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal first clarified 
the scope of Article IV(3), one of the treaty pillars of Argentina’s 
emergency defense.  Article IV(3) states in its entirety: 
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments 
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war 
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national 
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar 
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no 
less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals or 
companies of any third country, whichever is the more 
favourable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in 
relation to such losses.48 
This provision, according to the Tribunal, was only intended to 
refer to corrective measures, or the “minimum level of treatment 
for foreign investments that suffer losses in the host country by the 
simultaneous interplay of national and most favored nation 
treatments, and then only in respect of measures which the State 
‘adopts in relation to such losses.’”49  The Tribunal categorically 
emphasized that Article IV(3) could not be read as a “general 
escape clause from treaty obligations,” and “consequently does not 
result in the exclusion of wrongfulness, liability and eventual 
compensation.”50 
Moving on to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT as the crux of 
the interpretive controversy, the Tribunal held at the outset that: 
[T]he object and purpose of the Treaty is, as a general 
proposition, for it to be applicable in situations of economic 
difficulty and hardship that require the protection of the 
internationally guaranteed rights of its beneficiaries.  To 
this extent, any interpretation resulting in an escape route 
 
47 Id. para. 351. 
48 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. IV(3). 
49 Id. para. 362 (quotations omitted). 
50 Id. para. 363. 
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from defined obligations cannot be easily reconciled with 
that object and purpose.51 
The Tribunal then accepted the inclusion of economic emergencies 
as reasonably within the standard of “essential security interests” 
in Article XI. 
The interpretive problem commences with the Tribunal’s use of 
Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility to provide the 
content of “essential security interests” in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT: 
In addition, in view of the fact that the Treaty does not 
define what it is to be understood by an “essential security 
interest,” the requirements for a state of necessity under 
customary international law, as outlined above in 
connection with their expression in Article 25 of the Articles 
on State Responsibility, become relevant to the matter of 
establishing whether the necessary conditions have been 
met for its invocation under the Treaty.  Different might 
have been the case if the Treaty had defined this concept 
and the conditions for its exercise, but this was not the case. 
The Tribunal notes that in the view of Dean Slaughter and 
Professor Burke-White, which the Respondent shares, the 
CMS award was mistaken in that it discussed Article XI in 
connection with necessity under customary law.  This 
Tribunal believes, however, that the Treaty provision is 
inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as the 
definition of necessity and the conditions for its operation 
are concerned, given that it is under customary law that 
such elements have been defined.  Similarly, the Treaty 
does not contain a definition concerning either the 
maintenance of international peace and security, or the 
conditions for its operation.  Reference is instead made to 
the Charter of the United Nations in Article 6 of the 
Protocol to the Treaty.52 
The Tribunal did not cite any legal authority to support its 
decision to use Article 25 to provide substantive content for the 
 
51 Id. para. 373. 
52 Id. paras. 375–76 (citation omitted). 
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clause on “essential security interests” in Article XI.  While it 
conceded that the treaty regime as lex specialis prevails over general 
customary international law, the Tribunal summarily concluded 
that the absence of specified legal elements to determine the 
invocation of “essential security interests” in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT simply warranted the infusion of the legal elements 
under Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility.53 
Significantly, the Tribunal made no reference whatsoever to the 
unitary interpretive system of Article 31, much less the interpretive 
rules on the use of supplementary means under Article 32 of the 
VCLT. 
After reviewing the competing evidence on the nature of 
Article XI (and noting some reference to Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT),54 the Tribunal held that Article XI was not intended by the 
parties to be self-judging.  It reiterated that: 
[Because] the crisis invoked does not meet the customary 
law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles of State 
Responsibility, [the Tribunal] concludes that necessity or 
emergency is not conducive in this case to the preclusion of 
wrongfulness, and that there is no need to undertake a 
further judicial review under Article XI given that this 
 
53 Id. para. 378. 
It is no doubt correct to conclude that a treaty regime specifically dealing 
with a given matter will prevail over more general rules of customary 
law.  The problem here, however, is that the Treaty itself did not deal 
with the legal elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state 
of necessity.  The rule governing such questions will thus be found under 
customary law.  As concluded above, such requirements and conditions 
have not been fully met in this case.  Moreover, the view of the 
Respondent’s legal expert, as expressed at the hearing, contradicts the 
Respondent’s argument that the Treaty standards are not more 
favourable than those of customary law, and at the most should be 
equated with the international minimum standard.  The Tribunal does 
not believe that the intention of the parties can be described in the terms 
which the expert has used, as there is no indication that such was the 
case. Nor does the Tribunal believe that because Article XI did not make 
an express reference to customary law, this source of rights and 
obligations becomes inapplicable.  International law is not a fragmented 
body of law as far as basic principles are concerned and necessity is no 
doubt one such basic principle. 
Id. 
54 Id. para. 381. 
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Article does not set out conditions different from customary 
law in such regard.55 
With the defense of emergency and/or necessity rejected for all 
three legal streams (Argentine law and jurisprudence, customary 
international law, and Articles IV(3) and XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT), the Tribunal held that Argentina had a duty to compensate 
for its breaches of Articles II(2)(a) and (c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
While recognizing that Article IV of the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
constituted the legal standard for compensation,56 the Tribunal 
nevertheless held that it would “take into account the crisis 
conditions affecting Argentina when determining the 
compensation due for the liability found in connection with the 
breach of the Treaty standards.”57  The Tribunal ordered Argentina 
to compensate Sempra in the total amount of $128,250,462 (USD), 
an aggregate amount that represented the sum of Sempra’s equity 
value loss, its loss on a December 2001 loan, unpaid PPI 
adjustments, and nonpayment of subsidies within the terms of the 
Licenses. 
1.2. The LG&E Cases 
The three LG&E corporations who filed a claim against 
Argentina in LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E 
International Inc. (collectively “the LG&E Group”) are all 
corporations organized under the laws of the United States.  The 
LG&E Group has shareholdings in three local gas distribution 
companies in Argentina (45.9% in Distribuidora de Gas del Centro, 
14.4% in Distribuidora de Gas Cuyana S.A., and 19.6% in Gas 
Natural BAN S.A.).58  The LG&E Group participated in Argentina’s 
privatization process, where foreign investors were: 
 
55 Id. para. 388. 
56 Article IV(1) states: 
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action 
was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid without delay; 
include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of 
expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the 
prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.” 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, at VII(8). 
57 Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para. 397. 
58 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E Int’l Inc. v. 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 52 (2006). 
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[E]ncouraged to purchase shares with guarantees, such as 
tariffs calculated in U.S. dollars, automatic and periodic 
adjustments to the tariffs based on the PPI, a clear legal 
framework that could not be unilaterally modified, and the 
granting of “licenses” instead of “concessions” with a view 
to offering the highest degree of protection to prospective 
investors.59 
Following the Argentine economic and financial crisis, the 
Argentine government announced the mandatory renegotiation of 
all public service contracts, without offering to restore the legal 
guarantees that were eliminated by the 2002 Emergency Law and 
other governmental measures.  In its request for arbitration, the 
LG&E Group asserted Argentina’s breach of the following U.S.-
Argentina BIT obligations: Article II(2)(c) (umbrella clause); Article 
II(2)(a) (failure to accord fair and equitable treatment); Article 
II(2)(b) (taking arbitrary and discriminatory measures that impair 
the use and enjoyment of the Claimants’ investment; and Article 
IV(1) (indirect expropriation).  The LG&E Group filed a claim 
against Argentina for $248 million or, in the event the Tribunal 
concludes that there was expropriation, $268 million. 
The Tribunal rejected all of Argentina’s jurisdictional objections 
in its April 30, 2004 Decision on Objections on Jurisdiction.60  The 
Tribunal held that the LG&E Group had jus standi as foreign 
investors, even if they did not directly operate the investment in 
Argentina.61  It also held that the LG&E Group’s claims involved a 
dispute of a legal nature arising directly from an investment, since, 
at the jurisdictional phase, it was to be presumed that the claims 
were based on the alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.62  
Argentina also gave its consent to the arbitration through Article 
VII(4) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, while the LG&E Group gave its 
consent when it decided to submit their investment disputes to 
ICSID jurisdiction.63  Finally, the Tribunal held that LG&E Group’s 
 
59 Id. para. 49. 
60 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., & LG&E Int’l Inc. v. Argentina, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 84 (Apr. 
30, 2004). 
61 Id. para. 63. 
62 Id. para. 66. 
63 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, para. 22. 
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claims were also not time-barred or precluded by the pendency of 
negotiations by license holders with the Argentine government.64 
In its Decision on Liability, the Tribunal first established the 
applicable law to settle the dispute to be the second part of Article 
42(1) of the ICSID Convention—”the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and 
such rules of International Law as may be applicable.”65  The 
Tribunal laid a hierarchy of applicable laws to the dispute: 1) the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT; 2) “in the absence of explicit provisions” in the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, general international law; and 3) Argentine 
domestic law.66 
The Tribunal’s Decision on Liability began its analysis on the 
LG&E Group’s claims of breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  With 
respect to Article II(2)(a) (fair and equitable treatment), the 
Tribunal initially examined the nature of Argentina’s guarantees to 
investors, particularly in the gas industry, and concluded that 
Argentina’s legislative acts and the terms of the licenses had made 
four specific guarantees to investors in the gas transport and 
distribution centers: tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars 
before conversion into pesos; tariffs would be subject to semi-
annual adjustments according to the PPI; tariffs were to provide an 
income sufficient to cover all costs and a reasonable rate of return; 
and the tariff system would not be subject to freezing or price 
controls without compensation.67  Considering the impact of these 
industry-specific guarantees in generating investor expectations, 
the Tribunal held that Argentina violated Article II(2)(a) of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT by failing to accord fair and equitable treatment 
to investors when it unilaterally abrogated such guarantees.68  
 
64 Id. para. 23. 
65 Id. para. 82. 
66 Id. para. 99. 
67 Id. para. 119. 
68 Id. para. 133. 
Emerging from the economic crisis of the late 1980s, Argentina created 
an economic recovery plan mainly dependent upon foreign capital.  
Argentina prepared with the investment banks an attractive framework 
of laws and regulations that addressed the specific concerns of foreign 
investors with respect to the country risks involved in Argentina.  In 
light of these risks, Claimants relied upon certain key guarantees in the 
Gas Law and implementing regulations, such as calculation of the tariffs 
in US dollars before their conversion into pesos, the semi-annual PPI 
adjustments, tariffs set to provide sufficient revenues to cover all the 
costs and a reasonable rate of return, and compensation in the event that 
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Despite Argentina’s economic hardship, the Tribunal insisted that 
Argentina “went too far by completely dismantling the very legal 
framework constructed to attract investors.”69  As a corollary, the 
abrogation of these guarantees under Argentina’s statutory 
framework also breached the umbrella clause under Article II(2)(c) 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  In the words of the Tribunal, the 
abrogation of guarantees gave rise to corresponding violations of 
Argentina’s obligations to the LG&E Group’s investments: 
Argentina made these specific obligations to foreign 
investors, such as LG&E, by enacting the Gas Law and 
other regulations, and then advertising these guarantees in 
the Offering Memorandum to induce the entry of foreign 
capital to fund the privatization program in its public 
service sector.  These laws and regulations became 
obligations within the meaning of Article II(2)(c), by virtue 
of targeting foreign investors and applying specifically to 
their investments . . . .70 
On the other hand, the Tribunal ruled that Argentina did not 
breach Article II(2)(b) (discriminatory and arbitrary treatment).  
Noting that the U.S.-Argentina BIT did not define the term 
“arbitrary,” the Tribunal located its meaning between the plain 
meaning of the term under international law (“a willful disregard 
of due process of law”)71 and the apparent intent of the parties in 
the preambular clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT (“consideration of 
the effect of a measure on foreign investments and a balance of the 
interests of the State with any burden imposed on such 
investments”),72 to conclude that Argentina’s measures were not 
“arbitrary or discriminatory” because they were “the result of 
 
the Government altered the tariff scheme.  Having created specific 
expectations among investors, Argentina was bound by its obligations 
concerning the investment guarantees vis-à-vis public utility licensees, 
and in particular, the gas-distribution licensees.  The abrogation of these 
specific guarantees violates the stability and predictability underlying 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment. 
Id. 
69 Id. para. 139. 
70 Id. para. 175. 
71 Id. para. 157. 
72 Id. para. 158. 
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reasoned judgment rather than simple disregard of the rule of 
law.”73 
The Tribunal also rejected the LG&E Group’s claim of indirect 
expropriation in violation of Article IV(1) of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  The Tribunal held that Argentina’s abrogation of guarantees 
“did not deprive the investors of the right to enjoy their 
investment . . . the true interests at stake here are the investment’s 
asset base.”74  Since the LG&E Group retained control of their 
shares despite fluctuations in share value, there could not have 
been any expropriation.  As contemplated by the Tribunal, 
expropriation could only have occurred if there was a “permanent, 
severe deprivation of LG&E’s rights with regard to its investment, 
or almost complete deprivation of the value of LG&E’s 
investment.”75 
Having determined the existence of a breach of Articles II(2)(a) 
and II(2)(c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal then proceeded 
to examine Argentina’s alternative defense of necessity under 
Argentine law, Articles XI and IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, as 
well as customary international law.  Consistent with its earlier 
ruling establishing a hierarchy of applicable law to the dispute, the 
Tribunal first turned to the claims brought under Articles XI and 
IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
The Tribunal first concluded that Article XI was not self-
judging, “[b]ased on the evidence before the Tribunal regarding 
the understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was 
signed. . . .”76  The Tribunal then made a largely factual analysis to 
conclude that Argentina was “excused under Article XI from 
liability for any breaches of the Treaty between 1 December 2001 
and 26 April 2003,”77 characterizing Argentina’s measures of 
suspending the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and the PPI 
adjustment of tariffs, as well as the enactment of its Emergency 
Law as a “legitimate way of protecting its social and economic 
system.”78  Without clarifying the precise content of Article XI (or 
its substantive authority for interpreting “essential security 
interests”), the Tribunal simply rejected the LG&E’s narrow 
 
73 Id. para. 162. 
74 Id. para. 198. 
75 Id. paras. 199–200. 
76 Id. para. 212. 
77 Id. para. 229. 
78 Id. para. 239. 
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interpretation of “essential security interests” to circumstances 
amounting to military action and war.79  Without citing any legal 
authority, the Tribunal tautologically concluded that “Article XI 
refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act.  A 
State may have several responses at its disposal to maintain public 
order or protect its essential security interests.”80  With respect to 
Article IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal’s interpretive 
emphasis was likewise largely factual: 
Article IV(3) of the Treaty confirms that the States Party to 
the Bilateral Treaty contemplated the state of national 
emergency as a separate category of exceptional 
circumstances.  That is in line with the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Article XI of the Treaty.  Furthermore, the 
Tribunal has determined, as a factual matter that the grave 
crisis in Argentina lasted from 1 December 2001 until 26 
April 2003.  It has not been shown convincingly to the 
Tribunal that during that period the provisions of Article 
IV(3) of the Treaty have been violated by Argentina.  On the 
contrary, during that period, the measures taken by 
Argentina were “across the board.”81 
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the Tribunal had simply 
accepted Argentina’s plea that its economic emergency could 
verily be subsumed under the “essential security interests” 
standard in Article XI, or the “state of national emergency” 
standard in Article IV(3).  The Tribunal did not cite any legal 
authority for this interpretation, nor did it provide a legal standard 
for the effect of the applicability of Article XI, other than the 
Tribunal’s own conclusion that this “excused” Argentina from 
liability for breaches under the Treaty.  This conclusion as to the 
effect of the applicability of Article XI (e.g., to excuse a party from 
liability for breach) is found nowhere in the text of Article XI, much 
less the rest of the provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Compounding the paucity of clear explanation on the 
interpretive methodology and seemingly “legal” standards used 
by the Tribunal in relation to Article XI and Article IV(3) of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal still proceeded to refer to the 
 
79 Id. para. 238. 
80 Id. para. 239. 
81 Id. para. 244. 
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customary law doctrine of necessity represented by Article 25 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility in a “supportive”82 sense: 
The essential interests of the Argentine State were 
threatened in December 2001.  It faced an extremely serious 
threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to 
the possibility of maintaining its essential services in 
operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace.  
There is no serious evidence in the record that Argentina 
contributed to the crisis resulting in the state of necessity.  
In this (sic) circumstances, an economic recovery package 
was the only means to respond to the crisis.  Although 
there may have been a number of ways to draft the 
economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal 
demonstrates that an across-the-board response was 
necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be 
addressed.  It cannot be said that any other State’s rights 
were seriously impaired by the measures taken by 
Argentina during the crisis.  Finally, as addressed above, 
Article XI of the Treaty exempts Argentina of responsibility 
for measures enacted during the state of necessity. 
While this analysis concerning Article 25 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility alone does not establish 
Argentina’s defense, it supports the Tribunal’s analysis with 
regard to the meaning of Article XI’s requirement that the 
measures implemented by Argentina had to have been 
 
82 See id. para. 245. 
In the previous analysis, the Tribunal has determined that the conditions 
in Argentina from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003 were such that 
Argentina is excused from liability for the alleged violation of its Treaty 
obligations due to the responsive measures it enacted.  The concept of 
excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its international 
obligations during what is called a ‘state of necessity’ or ‘state of 
emergency’ also exists in international law.  While the Tribunal considers 
that the protections afforded by Article XI have been triggered in this 
case, and are sufficient to excuse Argentina’s liability, the Tribunal 
recognizes that satisfaction of the state of necessity standard as it exists in 
international law (reflected in Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility) supports the Tribunal’s conclusion. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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necessary either for the maintenance of public order or the 
protection of its own essential security interests.83 
Clearly, the Tribunal had already conflated the substantive 
content of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility towards 
a supplementary means of interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  Noting the duty to compensate under Article 27 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility, the Tribunal stated that it: 
. . . considers that Article XI establishes the state of necessity 
as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness of an act of 
the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability.  
This exception is appropriate only in emergency situations; 
and once the situation has been overcome, i.e. certain 
degree of stability has been recovered; the State is no longer 
exempted from responsibility for any violation of its 
obligations under the international law and shall reassume 
them immediately.84 
The effects of the Tribunal’s finding of the existence of a state of 
necessity were threefold.  First, the Tribunal held that “[a]ll 
measures adopted by Argentina in breach of the Treaty before and 
after the period during which the state of necessity prevailed, shall 
have all their effects and shall be taken into account by the 
Tribunal to estimate the damages.”85  The Tribunal also introduced 
distinctions on the scope and reckoning point for determining 
compensation.  Damages suffered during the state of necessity 
“should be borne by the investor.”86  However, once the state of 
necessity was over on April 26, 2003, Argentina “should have re-
established the tariff scheme offered to LG&E or, at least, it should 
have compensated Claimants for the losses incurred on account of 
the measures adopted before and after the state of necessity.”87 
The dispositive portion of the Tribunal’s Decision on Liability 
thus introduced a temporal dichotomy to the determination of 
Argentina’s liability.  Argentina would be exempt from the 
payment of compensation for damages incurred from the period of 
December 1, 2001 to April 26, 2003, when Argentina was in a state 
 
83 Id. paras. 256–58 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. para. 261. 
85 Id. para. 263. 
86 Id. para. 264. 
87 Id. para. 265. 
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of necessity.  However, it would be liable for damages for 
violations occurring outside the period of necessity. 
The amount of compensation Argentina owed to the LG&E 
Group was finally determined in the Tribunal’s July 25, 2007 
Award.88  The LG&E Group had claimed full compensation for 
damages sustained in the amount of either $268 million (USD) or 
$248 million (USD),89 including: the full market value of their loss, 
pre- and post-Award compound interest at a reasonable 
commercial rate, and the costs and expenses associated with the 
arbitration proceedings.90  Argentina opposed the LG&E Group’s 
valuation, citing the inadequacy of the methods used, the 
arbitrariness of the choice of valuation dates, the unjust enrichment 
of the LG&E Group, and the effect of the country risk premium in 
excluding compensation for the LG&E Group.91 
The Tribunal held that the applicable standard for reparation is 
“full reparation” as set out in the Chorzów Factory case and Article 
31 of the Articles on State Responsibility.92  The Tribunal rejected 
the fair market value standard in Article IV of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT as inapplicable to the breach of other treaty standards.93  
Instead, it adopted the standard of “actual loss” incurred “as a 
result” of the wrongful acts as the appropriate measure of 
compensation—or the amount of dividends that the LG&E Group 
would have received but for the abrogation of the specific 
guarantees.94  Using this metric, the Tribunal awarded $57.4 
million (USD) to the LG&E Group “for the damages suffered as a 
result of Respondent’s continuing breach of its Treaty obligations 
between 18 August 2000 and 28 February 2005, including interest 
up until the date of the Award.”95 
1.3. The CMS Gas Cases 
CMS Gas Transmission Company (“CMS”) is another 
American company that pursued claims against Argentina for its 
 
88 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (July 
25, 2007). 
89 Id. para. 15. 
90 Id. para. 10. 
91 Id. para. 22. 
92 Id. para. 31. 
93 Id. para. 37. 
94 Id. paras. 41–53. 
95 Id. para. 109. 
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suspension of the tariff adjustment formula for gas transportation.  
CMS is a 29.42% shareholder of Transportadora de Gas del Norte 
(TGN), an Argentine company with a license for gas 
transportation.  CMS alleged that beginning in late 1999, the 
Argentine government had taken measures which had an adverse 
impact on CMS’s business and breached the guarantees which 
protected CMS’s investment in TGN, and that such measures 
subsequently led to the devaluation of the currency and the 
adoption of additional financial and administrative measures also 
alleged to have an adverse impact on the investor.96 
In its Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, the Tribunal 
clarified the threshold of its review, stating that “it does not have 
jurisdiction over measures of general economic policy adopted by 
the Republic of Argentina and cannot pass judgment on whether 
they are right or wrong.”97  The Tribunal also concludes, however, 
that it “has jurisdiction to examine whether specific measures 
affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures of general 
economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have 
been adopted in violation of legally binding commitments made to 
the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts.”98  The Tribunal 
then rejected each of Argentina’s objections to jurisdiction, stating 
that: (1) CMS has jus standi as a foreign investor, there being “no 
bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims 
by shareholders independently from those of the corporation 
concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority or non-
controlling shareholders,”99 and that “[w]hether the protected 
investor is in addition a party to a concession agreement or a 
license agreement with the host State is immaterial for the purpose 
of finding jurisdiction [under the U.S.-Argentina BIT], since there is 
a direct right of action of shareholders;”100 (2) the dispute arises 
directly from an investment made, because the rights of CMS “can 
be asserted independently from the rights of TGN and those 
relating to the License, and because [CMS] has a separate cause of 
action under the Treaty in connection with the protected 
 
96 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 20 (July 17, 2003). 
97 Id. para. 33. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. para. 48. 
100 Id. para. 65. 
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investment;”101 (3) “the clauses in the License or its Terms referring 
certain kinds of disputes to the local courts of the Republic of 
Argentina are not a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction by an ICSID 
tribunal under the Treaty, as the functions of these various 
instruments are different,”102 and in this connection, “contractual 
claims are different from treaty claims even if there had been or 
there currently was a recourse to the local courts for breach of 
contract, this would not have prevented submission of the treaty 
claims to arbitration;”103 and (4) the pendency of negotiations 
between the Argentine government and various classes of 
investors would not prevent the arbitration from proceeding.104 
In the merits phase, CMS advanced similar legal arguments as 
those in the LG&E cases.  CMS maintained that the Argentine 
government’s measures violated commitments made to foreign 
investors in the offering memoranda, relevant laws and 
regulations, and the terms of License, which commitments include: 
(1) the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars; (2) the semi-annual 
adjustment in accordance with the U.S. PPI and the general 
adjustment of tariffs every five years; and (3) the Argentine 
government’s express agreement not to freeze the tariff structure 
or subject it to further regulation or price controls, and the duty to 
compensate in the event such price controls were introduced.105  
The collective and continuous violation of these commitments, 
according to CMS, breached the following provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT: Article IV (wrongful expropriation), Article II(2)(a) 
(fair and equitable treatment standard), Article II(2)(b) (prohibition 
against arbitrary and discriminatory measures), and Article II(2)(c) 
(umbrella clause).  As compensation, CMS claimed $261.1 million 
(USD) for breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT plus interests and 
costs. 
In turn, Argentina raised the following factual defenses: (1) the 
license and its concomitant legal and regulatory framework only 
provide for the right of a licensee to a fair and reasonable tariff, but 
 
101 Id. para. 68. 
102 Id. para. 76. 
103 Id. para. 80. 
104 See id. para. 86 (“The Centre had made efforts to avoid a multiplicity of 
tribunals and jurisdictions, but that it was not possible to foreclose rights that 
different investors might have under different arrangements.”). 
105 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, paras. 84–88 (May 12, 2005). 
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did not contain guarantees of convertibility, currency devaluation, 
and the risk inherent to the investment;106 (2) CMS should bear the 
consequences of its own investment strategies;107 and (3) the tariff 
structure already carried a premium (and, higher profits) for the 
added risk of investing in an unstable economy, and because the 
contractual regime was incomplete (the licenses did not 
contemplate the possibility of convertibility being abandoned), 
Argentina’s domestic market pesification and external market 
dollarization allowed consumers to continue to pay for gas and 
prevented a collapse in demand.108  Given this legal and regulatory 
context, there could not be any violation of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 
since the “guarantees invoked by CMS are not the property of the 
company protected under the Treaty and TGN continues to 
operate normally.”109  As an alternative ground, Argentina invoked 
the existence of a national emergency as a ground for exemption 
from liability under international law and the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Using Argentine law, the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and principles of 
international law as the applicable law to the dispute, the Tribunal 
commenced its analysis by establishing CMS’ rights: 1) the right to 
a tariff calculated in dollars and converted into pesos at the time of 
billing;110 2) the right to adjustment of tariffs in accordance with the 
U.S. PPI;111 and 3) the right to stabilization mechanisms as 
provided under the terms of the License.112  According to the 
Tribunal: 
[T]he legal framework and the License, particularly in the 
context of the privatization, was to guarantee the stability 
of the tariff structure and the role the calculation in dollars 
and the US PPI adjustment played therein.  Devaluation 
 
106 See id. paras. 91–94 (enumerating the Argentine government’s defenses to 
CSM’s claims). 
107 See id. para. 92 (“The Respondent is of the view that any consequences 
arising from CMS’s decision to rely on the report of private consultants for its 
investment strategies cannot be assigned to the Government.”). 
108 See id. paras. 95–96 (“[T]he Respondent filled in by means of the 
pesification in the domestic market and dollarization in the external market, 
thereby allowing consumers to continue to pay for gas and avoiding the collapse 
of demand.”). 
109 Id. para. 98. 
110 Id. paras. 127–38 . 
111 Id. paras. 139–44. 
112 Id. paras. 145–51. 
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could of course happen at some point, but then the tariff 
structure would remain intact within the framework of 
stability envisaged as it would adjust automatically to the 
new level of the exchange rate.113 
The Tribunal initially considered the defense of state of 
necessity under the Argentine legal system, and concluded that 
“the state of necessity under domestic law does not offer an excuse 
if the result of the measures in question is to alter the substance or 
the essence of contractually acquired rights.  This is particularly so 
if the application of such measures extends beyond a strictly 
temporary period.”114  The Tribunal noted that any rebalancing of 
the contractual commitments due to Argentina’s economic 
circumstances “were available under [Argentine] law and the 
License.  The necessary adjustments could be accommodated 
within the structure of the guarantees offered to the Claimant.”115 
After the foregoing clarification, the Tribunal then separately 
discussed the alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  It held 
that there was no violation of Article IV(1) (indirect or creeping 
expropriation), because Argentina’s acts did not amount to a 
substantial deprivation of CMS’ investment in TGN.116  Likewise, 
the Tribunal rejected CMS’ claim of Argentina’s breach of Article 
II(2)(b) (prohibition against arbitrariness or discrimination), on the 
finding that “there has been no impairment, for example, in respect 
of the management and operation of the investment,”117 nor any 
discernible discrimination in the context of the gas transportation 
and distribution industry.118  However, the Tribunal found that 
Argentina breached Article II(2)(a) (fair and equitable treatment 
standard), since “the measures that are complained of did in fact 
entirely transform and alter the legal and business environment 
under which the investment was decided and made,” and that “the 
guarantees given in this connection under the legal framework and 
its various components were crucial for the investment 
decision.”119  In light of this violation, the Tribunal also declared 
 
113 Id. para. 161. 
114 Id. para. 217. 
115 Id. para. 238. 
116 Id. para. 262–64. 
117 Id. para. 292. 
118 Id. para. 293. 
119 Id. para. 275. 
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Argentina’s breach of the umbrella clause under Article II(2)(c) of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Finding that Argentina breached Articles II(2)(a) and II(2)(c) of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal then turned to Argentina’s 
alternative defense of necessity.  It first examined the defense 
under customary international law, as represented by Article 25 of 
the Articles of State Responsibility, and held that in the context of 
the Argentine crisis, some of its elements were “partially present 
here and there but when the various elements, conditions and 
limits are examined as a whole it cannot be concluded that all such 
elements meet the cumulative test.”120  Considering the strict and 
exceptional legal threshold of Article 25, this finding was 
uncontroversial. 
The more contentious issue arose from the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Articles XI and IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
The Tribunal began its reasoning by declaring what it held to be 
the “design” of the BIT “to protect investments at a time of 
economic difficulties or other circumstances leading to the 
adoption of adverse measures by the Government.”121  However, 
the Tribunal suddenly imported an element from Article 25 of the 
Articles of State Responsibility—”the act does not seriously impair 
an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole”—
as intrinsic to furthering the apparent design of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, which, in the present case, the Tribunal concluded Argentina 
had not shown.122  The Tribunal did not cite any legal authority or 
interpretive basis for using this element of Article 25 to interpret 
the structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  The Tribunal then 
proceeded to conduct a broad interpretation of “essential security 
interests” under Article XI to embrace the concept of economic 
emergencies.123  However, it was careful to note that Article XI is 
 
120 Id. para. 331. 
121 Id. para. 354. 
122 See id. paras. 357–58. 
For the purpose of this case, and looking at the Treaty just in the context 
of its States parties, the Tribunal concludes that it does not appear that an 
essential interest of the State to which the obligation exists has been 
impaired, nor have those of the international community as a whole.  
Accordingly, the plea of necessity would not be precluded on this count. 
Id. 
123 See id. paras. 359–60. 
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not a “self-judging” clause.124  Notwithstanding the applicability of 
Article XI to economic emergencies, the Tribunal still held that 
there was a duty to compensate, analogous to (if not predicated on) 
Article 27 of the Articles on State Responsibility.125  In determining 
the standard of compensation, the Tribunal then held that “the 
cumulative nature of the breaches . . . is best dealt with by 
resorting to the standard of fair market value.”126  Applying a 
discounted cash flow methodology, the Tribunal arrived at the 
amount of $133.2 million (USD) as compensation for damages and 
the loss in value of CMS’s shares.  Upon Argentina’s payment of an 
additional  $2,148,100 (USD), CMS would also transfer ownership 
of its shares in TGN to Argentina.127 
Argentina sought annulment of the Award under Article 52(b) 
and (e) of the ICSID Convention, claiming that the Tribunal had 
 
While the text of the Article does not refer to economic crises or 
difficulties of that particular kind, as concluded above, there is nothing 
in the context of customary international law or the object and purpose 
of the Treaty that could on its own exclude major economic crises from 
the scope of Article XI.  It must also be kept in mind that the scope of a 
given bilateral treaty, such as this, should normally be understood and 
interpreted as attending to the concerns of both parties.  If the concept of 
essential security interests were to be limited to immediate political and 
national security concerns, particularly of an international character, and 
were to exclude other interests, for example, major economic 
emergencies, it could well result in an unbalanced understanding of 
Article XI.  Such an approach would not be entirely consistent with the 
rules governing the interpretation of treaties. 
Id. 
124 See id. para. 373. 
In light of this discussion, the Tribunal concludes first that the clause of 
Article XI of the Treaty is not a self-judging clause.  Quite evidently, in 
the context of what a State believes to be an emergency, it will most 
certainly adopt the measures it considers appropriate without requesting 
the views of any court.  However, if the legitimacy of such measures is 
challenged before an international tribunal, it is not for the State in 
question but for the international jurisdiction to determine whether the 
plea of necessity may exclude wrongfulness.  It must also be noted that 
clauses dealing with investments and commerce do not generally affect 
security as much as military events do and, therefore, would normally 
fall outside the scope of such dramatic events. 
Id. 
125 Id. paras. 383–94. 
126 Id. para. 410. 
127 See id. paras. 468–69 (providing the amount of compensation for damages 
and value of the shares). 
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manifestly exceeded its powers and failed to state the reasons on 
which the Award was based.128  Argentina argued that the 
Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers by transforming the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT’s “fair and equitable treatment” clause and 
“umbrella” clause into strict liability provisions, by failing to give 
effect to Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT, and by rejecting 
Argentina’s defense of necessity under customary international 
law.129 
The Ad Hoc Committee dismissed all of Argentina’s claims, 
except for one.  The Ad Hoc Committee annulled the first sub-
paragraph of the Award, which provided that “The Respondent 
[Argentina] breached its obligations . . . to observe the obligations 
entered into with regard to the investment guaranteed in Article 
II(2)(c) [umbrella clause] of the Treaty.”130  The Committee found 
that there were “major difficulties with [the Tribunal’s] broad 
interpretation of Article II(2)(c),” since, as the Committee clarified, 
“[t]he obligation of the State covered by Article II(2)(c) will often be 
a bilateral obligation, or will be intrinsically linked to obligations of 
the investment company . . . if the Tribunal’s interpretation is right, 
then the mechanism in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention is 
unnecessary whenever there is an umbrella clause.”131  Apart from 
annulling this portion of the Award, the Ad Hoc Committee 
nonetheless held that the Tribunal’s finding of breach of Article 
II(2)(a), the fair and equitable treatment standard of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, was “adequately founded on the applicable law 
and the relevant facts,” and “the Tribunal evaluated the legality of 
the challenged measures in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case and did not transform Article II(2)(a) into a strict liability 
clause.”132  The Ad Hoc Committee then reiterated that Argentina 
had to accept the transfer of ownership of TGN shares as provided 
in the Tribunal’s Award.  During the pendency of Argentina’s 
Application for Annulment, ICSID had provisionally stayed 
enforcement of the Award, particularly with respect to Argentina’s 
 
128 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Sept. 25, 2007. 
129 Id. para. 48. 
130 Id. para. 100 (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, at 139 para. 1). 
131 Id. para. 95. 
132 Id. para. 85. 
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option to purchase CMS’ shares in TGN as provided in 
subparagraph 3 of the Award.133 
The Ad Hoc Committee’s Decision on the Application for 
Annulment was a significant departure from the interpretive 
trends in Sempra, LG&E, and the Tribunal’s Award in CMS.  All of 
these prior decisions had, in varying degrees, used the doctrine of 
necessity under customary international law (as codified under 
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility) as a 
supplementary means of interpreting “essential security interests” 
in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  In contrast, however, the 
Ad Hoc Committee’s Decision attempted to set out specific 
distinctions between Article XI and Article 25 as to substantive 
content, operation, and effects: 
The Committee observes first that there is some analogy in 
the language used in Article XI of the BIT and in Article 25 
of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility.  The first text 
mentions “necessary” measures and the second relates to 
the “state of necessity”.  However Article XI specifies the 
conditions under which the Treaty may be applied, 
whereas Article 25 is drafted in a negative way: it excludes 
the application of the state of necessity on the merits, unless 
certain stringent conditions are met.  Moreover, Article XI is a 
threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive obligations 
under the Treaty do not apply.  By contrast, Article 25 is an 
excuse which is only relevant once it has been decided that 
there has otherwise been a breach of those substantive 
obligations.134 
Furthermore Article XI and Article 25 are substantively 
different.  The first covers measures necessary for the maintenance 
of public order or the protection of each Party’s own essential 
security interests, without qualifying such measures.  The second 
subordinates the state of necessity to four conditions.  It requires 
for instance that the action taken “does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation 
 
133 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Argentina’s Request 
for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Sept. 1, 2006. 
134 CMS Gas Transmission Co., Decision on the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 129 
(emphasis added). 
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exists, or of the international community as a whole,” a condition 
which is foreign to Article XI.  In other terms, the requirements 
under Article XI are not the same as those under customary 
international law as codified by Article 25, as the Parties in fact 
recognized during the hearing before the Committee.  On that 
point, the Tribunal made a manifest error of law. 
Those two texts having a different operation and content, it 
was necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their 
relationship and to decide whether they were both applicable in 
the present case.  The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis, 
simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same 
footing. 
In doing so the Tribunal made another error of law.  One could 
wonder whether state of necessity in customary international law 
goes to the issue of wrongfulness or that of responsibility.  But in 
any case, the excuse based on customary international law could 
only be subsidiary to the exclusion based on Article XI. 
If state of necessity means that there has not been even a prima 
facie breach of the BIT, it would be a primary rule of international 
law.  But this is also the case with Article XI.  In other terms, and to 
take the words of the International Court of Justice in a comparable 
case,135 if the Tribunal was satisfied by the arguments based on 
Article XI, it should have held that there had been “no breach” of 
the BIT.  Article XI and Article 25 thus construed would cover the 
same field and the Tribunal should have applied Article XI as the 
lex specialis governing the matter and not Article 25. 
If, on the contrary, the state of necessity in customary 
international law goes to the issue of responsibility, it would be a 
secondary rule of international law—this was the position taken by 
the ILC.  In this case, the Tribunal would have been under an 
obligation to consider first whether there had been any breach of 
the BIT and whether such a breach was excluded by Article XI. 
Only if it concluded that there was conduct not in conformity with 
the Treaty would it have had to consider whether Argentina’s 
responsibility could be precluded in whole or in part under 
customary international law. 
These two errors made by the Tribunal could have had a 
decisive impact on the operative part of the Award.  As admitted 
by CMS, the Tribunal gave an erroneous interpretation to Article 
 
135 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Merits), 2003 I.C.J. (Nov. 6), para. 34. 
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XI.  In fact, it did not examine whether the conditions laid down by 
Article XI were fulfilled and whether, as a consequence, the 
measures taken by Argentina were capable of constituting, even 
prima facie, a breach of the BIT.  If the Committee was acting as a 
court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this 
ground. 
The Committee recalls, once more, that it has only a limited 
jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. Under the 
circumstances, the Committee cannot simply substitute its own 
view of the law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of 
the Tribunal.  Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in 
the Award, in the end the Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty.  
Although applying it cryptically and defectively, it applied it.  
Accordingly, there is no manifest excess of powers.”136 
The foregoing excerpt shows that the Ad Hoc Committee 
envisaged a clear line of demarcation between Article XI and 
Article 25 as to their respective substantive requirements, so much so 
that the CMS Tribunal made a “manifest error of law” in conflating 
the requirements under each norm to interpret “essential security 
interests” under Article XI.137  According to the Ad Hoc Committee, 
the Tribunal’s failure to “examine whether the conditions laid 
down by Article XI were fulfilled” generated the erroneous 
interpretation of Article XI.138  The Tribunal’s assumption that 
Article 25 and Article XI “were on the same footing” was thus 
“another error in law.”139 
However, the Ad Hoc Committee fell short of giving a definitive 
position on what interpretive relationship Article 25 could have 
with Article XI.  Instead, it laid out two possible alternative 
scenarios for construing Article 25 in relation to Article XI.  First, 
Article 25 could be seen as a “primary rule of international law,” 
where a state of necessity would mean that there is no prima facie 
 
136  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, paras. 129–26 (emphasis added). 
137 See id. paras. 130-31 (“On that point, the Tribunal made a manifest error of 
law. . . . The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis [discerning the 
relationship between Article XI and Article 25 and their relative applicability to 
the case], simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same 
footing.”).  
138 Id. para. 135. 
139 Id. paras. 131–32. 
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breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.140  Both Article 25 and Article XI 
would operate as norms of exclusion, or norms that would prevent a 
breach of international obligation from arising in the first instance.  
According to the Ad Hoc Committee, in this scenario, Article XI 
should be applied as lex specialis.  The effect of applying Article XI, 
however, would be to construe the “necessity” measure as 
incapable of giving rise to any breach of obligation under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. 
The second scenario treats Article 25 as a “secondary rule of 
international law” that pertains to responsibility.141  Under this 
formulation, according to the Ad Hoc Committee, the Tribunal 
would have to follow this sequence: (1) determine the existence of 
any breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT; (2) if there is a breach, 
determine if the breach is “excluded” by Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT; and (3) if there is any remaining breach that cannot 
be excluded under the terms of Article XI, determine if the state’s 
responsibility for the breach can be precluded under Article 25.142 
It should be emphasized that the Ad Hoc Committee avoided a 
choice between either scenario, justifying its reticence through the 
Committee’s limited mandate under Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.  As will be shown later, however, this very same 
hesitation to settle the interpretive relationship between Article 25 
and Article XI would foment further interpretive confusion in the 5 
September 2008 Award in Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina.  Further 
confusion would be engendered by the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
interpretation (and without citing any authority) that “if [Article 
XI] applies, the substantive obligations under the [U.S.-Argentina 
BIT] do not apply.”143  As will be shown in the next section, these 
gaps in the interpretive methodology used for Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT would resurface in a doubly problematic 
manner in the Continental Award. 
 
140 Id. para. 133. 
141 Id. para. 134. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 129. 
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1.4. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic: Synthesis 
and Critique 
As of this writing, the Tribunal’s Award in Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 
Argentina144 (“Continental”) is the latest ICSID decision 
interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT in relation to the 
doctrine of necessity under customary international law.  
Continental contains the most controversial interpretive 
methodology to date on Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
1.4.1. Synthesis 
Continental Casualty Company is an American corporation, a 
subsidiary of another American corporation, CNA Financial Inc., 
and is the 99.9995% owner of CNA ART; an Argentine corporation 
that provides workers’ compensation insurance services in 
Argentina.  CNA ART maintained a portfolio of investment 
securities consisting mainly of cash deposits, treasury bills, and 
government bonds.  Prior to March 2001, these assets were 
denominated in Argentine pesos which were then fully convertible 
1:1 into U.S. dollars.  After March 2001, CNA ART invested in low-
risk U.S.-denominated assets for a total value of $100,998,000 
(USD).  Argentinean regulations of CNA ART’s insurance 
operations generally required investment of all capital within 
Argentina.  Starting December 2001, however, Argentina enacted a 
series of measures collectively known as the Capital Control 
Regime145 that, according to Continental, “destroyed the legal 
security of the assets” and frustrated CNA ART’s ability to hedge 
 
144 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Sept. 5, 
2008. 
145 Id. para. 137.  According to the Tribunal, measures could be grouped 
among the following: (1) measures that blocked deposits (temporary bank freeze), 
severely curtailing the right to withdraw money (Decree 1570/Corralito); (2) 
measures that prohibited the transfer of funds abroad and their exchange in freely 
convertible and transferable currencies (Decree 1570/Corralito); (3) measures that 
terminated the peso convertibility and its pegging to the U.S. dollar at the fixed 
exchange rate 1:1 (Emergency Law 25,561 and Decree 260/02) – replaced by a 
dual exchange system based on 1.4 pesos to 1 U.S. dollar, later permitted 
devaluation to almost 4 pesos to 1 U.S. dollar; (4) measures that rescheduled term 
deposits and reduced interest rates (Resolution 6/Corralon); (5) pesification 
(forced conversion) of outstanding dollar-denominated contracts and private or 
governmental debt, at a rate of 1.40 pesos for each nominal US dollar as to the 
latter and financial deposits, while in all other cases conversion occurred at par 
(Decree 214, Decree 471, Decree 644); and (6) default on and unilateral 
rescheduling of governmental debt (Resolution 73). 
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against the risk of peso devaluation.146  Continental claims that 
CNA ART suffered an absolute loss in value of its assets of 
$46,412,000 (USD) due to the Capital Control Regime.147  Thus, 
when Continental brought its claim against Argentina before 
ICSID, Continental asserted four violations of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT: (1) the umbrella clause, or the requirement to observe 
obligations under Article II(2)(c); (2) the requirement to provide 
treatment in accordance with international law (fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection of security, most favoured nation clause) 
under Articles II(2)(b) and II(2)(a); (3) the requirement to permit all 
investment-related transfers without delay under Article V; and (4) 
the requirement to pay compensation upon acts of expropriation 
under Article IV.148 
Argentina’s theory of defenses in its Counter-Memorial refuted 
each of the foregoing asserted violations.  First, Argentina insisted 
that there was no violation of the umbrella clause, since the latter 
does not apply to contracts entered into between CNA and 
Argentina.  “The umbrella clause is intended to protect the 
commitments assumed by Argentina towards foreign investors 
protected by the BIT, not contractual obligations.”149  Second, 
Argentina argued that there was no violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, since the standard must be applied 
“considering especially the circumstances under which [the Capital 
Control Regime] measures were adopted.”150  According to 
Argentina, “fair and equitable treatment is the minimum 
international treatment”—a standard meaning “reasonability, 
proportionality, and no discrimination.”151  It claimed the Capital 
Control Regime measures were proportional, reasonable, and not 
inconsistent as they re-established “a balance among all the 
economic agents” and “re-adapted the circumstances to the 
prevailing economic situation.”152  Third, Argentina claimed that 
there was no violation of the requirement to permit all investment-
related transfers, because at all times Argentina allowed all such 
transfers.  During a short interval within the Argentine financial 
 
146 Id. para. 19. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. para. 20 
149 Id. para. 295. 
150 Id. para. 56 (citation omitted). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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crisis, authorization was required for transfers, “but neither 
Continental nor CNA ART ever asked for such authorization.”153  
Fourth, Argentina argued that there could not be any 
expropriation as contemplated in Article IV of the BIT because 
none of the Capital Control Regime measures affected 
Continental’s investment value in CNA ART.  Under this 
reasoning, Continental cannot claim for alleged damages to CNA 
ART’s investments, but only for damages in relation to 
Continental’s shareholdings in CNA.154 
Finally, in the event that the Tribunal would find a breach of 
any of the foregoing U.S.-Argentina BIT provisions, Argentina 
reasserted its alternative defenses based on Articles XI and IV(3) of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  To recall, the full text of these provisions 
state: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public 
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the Protection of its own essential security 
interests. 
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments 
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war 
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national 
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar 
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no 
less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals or 
companies or to nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the more favourable treatment, as 
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.155 
After a copious discussion of the factual background on the 
Argentine economy and the development of the Argentine 
financial crisis, the Tribunal proceeded to resolve Continental’s 
claims on the merits by beginning with a discussion of Article XI in 
relation to the doctrine of state of necessity under customary 
international law as codified under Article 25 of the Articles on 
 
153 Id. para. 54. 
154 Id. para. 55. 
155 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI & IV(3). 
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State Responsibility.  In paragraph 164 of the Award, the Tribunal 
reiterated the Ad Hoc Committee’s position in the CMS Gas 
Decision on the Application for Annulment, which characterized 
Article XI as a norm of exclusion that operates to prevent 
substantive obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT from 
becoming applicable: 
The ordinary meaning of the language used, together with 
the object and purpose of the provision (as here highlighted 
and interpreted under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties) clearly indicates that either party 
would not be in breach of its BIT obligations if any measure 
has been properly taken because it was necessary, as far as 
relevant here, either “for the maintenance of the public 
order’ or for ‘the protection of essential security interests” 
of the party adopting such measures.  The consequence 
would be that, under Art. XI, such measures would lie 
outside the scope of the Treaty so that the party taking it 
would not be in breach of the relevant BIT provision.   . . .  
Art. XI restricts or derogates from the substantial 
obligations undertaken by the parties to the BIT in so far as 
the conditions of its invocation are met.  [Footnote 236 
indicates: “This Tribunal is thus minded to accept the 
position of the Ad Hoc Annulment Committee in the ICSID 
case CMS v. Argentina, where it states: ‘Article XI is a 
threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive 
obligations under the Treaty do not apply.  By contrast, 
Article 25 is an excuse which is only relevant once it has 
been decided that there has otherwise been a breach of 
those substantive obligations.’  On the one hand, if Art. XI 
is applicable because the measure at issue was necessary in 
order to safeguard essential security interest, then the treaty 
is inapplicable to such measure.  On the other hand, if a 
State is forced by necessity to resort to a measure in breach 
of an international obligation but complying with the 
requirements listed in Art. 25 ILC, the State escapes from 
the responsibility that would otherwise derive from that 
breach.”]  In fact, Art. XI has been defined as a safeguard 
clause; it has been said that it recognizes “reserved rights”, 
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or that it contemplates “non-precluded” measures to which 
a contracting state party can resort.156 
After taking this doctrinal position, the Tribunal stressed that 
there are conceptual “links” between Article XI and Article 25, in 
that “both intend to provide flexibility in the application of 
international obligations, recognizing that necessity to protect 
national interests of a paramount importance may justify setting 
aside or suspending an obligation, or preventing liability from its 
breach.”157  The Tribunal noted that “the practical result of 
applying [Art. XI rather than Art. 25] may be the same: condoning 
conduct that would otherwise be unlawful and thus removing the 
responsibility of the State.”158 
The Tribunal thus made its resolution on the merits by initially 
applying Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  The Tribunal then 
interpreted the text of Article XI as encompassing Argentina’s 
Capital Control Regime measures, as they involved the 
“maintenance of public order” and/or the protection of 
Argentina’s “essential security interests.”159  The Tribunal 
construed “public order” as a “broad synonym for ‘public peace’” 
(orden público in the Spanish text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 
corresponding to the French ordre public).160  Under this denotative 
rubric: 
[A]ctions properly necessary by the central government to 
preserve or to restore civil peace and the normal life of 
society . . . to prevent and repress illegal actions and 
disturbances that may infringe such civil peace and 
potentially threaten the legal order, even when due to 
significant economic and social difficulties, do fall within 
the application under Art. XI.161 
On the other hand, the Tribunal’s interpretation of “essential 
security interests” under Article XI proved demonstrably 
convoluted.  While the Tribunal recognized conceptual distinctions 
 
156 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Sept. 5, 
2008, para. 164 (emphasis added). 
157 Id. para. 168. 
158 Id. para. 168 
159 Id. paras. 174–75. 
160 Id. para 174. 
161 Id. 
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between Article 25 and Article XI,162 the flow of reasoning in the 
award indicates that the Tribunal apparently still used the 
customary international law doctrine on state of necessity as an 
interpretive foil to broadly define the motivation and content of 
“essential security interests” under Article XI.163  “Essential 
security interests,” according to the Tribunal, could be construed 
within the same acceptation of “wide variety of interests” under 
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility.  However, unlike 
the high threshold of “grave and imminent peril” under Article 25, 
the Tribunal imposed a lower threshold for measures that are 
covered by essential security interests under Article XI: 
The protection of essential security interests recognized by 
Art. XI does not require that “total collapse” of the country 
or that a “catastrophic situation” has already occurred 
before responsible national authorities may have recourse 
to its protection.  The invocation of the clause does not 
require that the situation has already degenerated into one 
that calls for the suspension of constitutional guarantees 
and fundamental liberties.164 
 
162 Id. para. 164–65. 
163 See id. paras. 175, 190–91 (“[The ILC commentary to Art. 25] ought to be 
considered not only as a more precise explanation of the term ‘necessary’ with 
regard to invocation of the defense of necessity under customary international 
law, but also as a standard applicable in interpreting Art. XI of the BIT.”). 
As to “essential security interests”, it is necessary to recall that 
international law is not blind to the requirement that States should be 
able to exercise their sovereignty in the interest of their population free 
from internal as well as external threats to their security and the 
maintenance of a peaceful domestic order.  It is well known that the 
concept of international security of States in the Post World War II 
international order was intended to cover not only political and military 
security but also the economic security of States and of their population. 
The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations and, even more 
relevant for the present case, that of the International Monetary Fund 
support this approach.  As noted by the International Law Commission, 
States have invoked necessity “to protect a wide variety of interests, including 
safeguarding the environment, preserving the very existence of the State and its 
people in time of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian 
population.” 
Id. para. 175 (citing Article 25 of the ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility) (emphasis added). 
164 Id. para. 180 (citations omitted). 
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It is also of considerable interest that the Tribunal used a 
plethora of legal sources to interpret Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  While initially pointing out that Article XI derives 
from the U.S. Model BIT and the U.S. Friendship Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) treaties,165 the Tribunal suddenly drew on the 
U.S. FCN treaties’ supposed derivation from Article XX of GATT 
1947 to justify reference to GATT and WTO case law: 
The Tribunal is thus faced with the task of determining the 
content of the concept of necessity in Art. XI, in order to 
decide whether the various Measures challenged by the 
Claimant were indeed necessary, as a matter of causation.  
With regard to the necessity test required for the 
application of the BIT, for the reasons stated above relating 
to the different role of Art. XI and of the defense of 
necessity in customary international law, the Tribunal does 
not share the opinion that “the treaty thus becomes 
inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as to 
the conditions for the operation of the state of necessity are 
concerned”, as stated in the Enron Case and submitted also 
by the Claimant.  Since the text of Art. XI derives from the 
parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties 
in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the 
Tribunal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and 
WTO case law which has extensively dealt with the concept and 
requirements of necessity in the context of economic measures 
derogating to the obligations contained in the GATT, rather than 
to refer to the requirement of necessity under customary 
international law.166 
The Tribunal then cited GATT and WTO case law to justify its 
methodology for interpreting “necessary measures” under Article 
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  It determined the standard of 
“necessary” under a context of “assess[ing] whether the [Capital 
Control Regime] Measures contributed materially to the realization 
of their legitimate aims under Art. XI of the BIT, namely the 
protection of the essential security interests of Argentina in the 
economic and social crisis it was facing.”167  In applying the 
 
165 Id. para. 176. 
166 Id. para. 192 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
167 Id. para. 196. 
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standard, the Tribunal advanced an interest- and value-driven test 
for determining the necessity of a measure: 
The necessity of a measure should be determined through 
“a process of weighing and balancing of factors” which 
usually includes the assessment of the following three 
factors: the relative importance of interests or values 
furthered by the challenged measures, the contribution of 
the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it and 
the restrictive impact of the measure on international 
commerce.168 
Under this broader concept of necessity, the Tribunal then 
concluded that the Capital Control Regime measures were “in part 
inevitable, or unavoidable,” that they were “in part indispensable” 
and that they were “in any case material or decisive in order to 
react positively to the crisis, to prevent the complete break-down of 
the financial system, the implosion of the economy and the 
growing threat to the fabric of Argentinean society and generally 
to assist in overcoming the crisis.”169  While the Tribunal held that 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self-judging, the 
Tribunal’s review of the Capital Control Regime measures yielded 
the conclusion that Argentina could properly invoke Article XI to 
justify virtually all of the measures.  The only measure held outside 
the ambit of Article XI was the Argentine government’s 
restructuring of the LETEs (treasury bills), which involved a swap 
offering at a later date, with a reduced percentage of the original 
value of the debt, and onerously conditioned on the waiver of any 
other rights of the security holder/investor.170 
Having determined the applicability of Article XI to almost all 
of the Capital Control Regime measures, the Tribunal then 
proceeded to determine the existence of any breach of the BIT as 
alleged by Continental.  Significantly, the Tribunal rejected each of 
the breaches alleged by Continental, largely upon factual grounds 
pertaining to Continental and CNA ART.  The Tribunal held that 
Argentina did not breach Article V (freedom of transfer),171 since 
 
168 Id. para. 194 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, para. 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000)). 
169 Id. para. 197. 
170 Id. para. 221. 
171 Id. para. 244. 
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the type of transfer which Continental claimed had been barred 
was, in reality, “merely a change of type, location and currency of 
part of an investor’s existing investment, namely a part of the 
freely disposable funds, held short term at its banks by CNA 
[ART] . . . .”172 
With respect to Continental’s claim of breach of Article II(2)(a) 
(fair and equitable treatment), the Tribunal examined various 
operative facts to ascertain the existence of a breach: 1) specificity 
of the undertaking allegedly relied upon; 2) general legislative 
statements which engender reduced expectations, especially with 
competent major international investors in a context where the 
political risk is high; 3) unilateral modification of contractual 
undertakings by governments; 4) centrality to the protected 
investment and impact of the changes on the operation of the 
foreign-owned business in general including its profitability.173  
Focusing on these operative facts, the Tribunal held that 
Continental could not invoke legitimate expectations as to the 
change of the convertibility regime, and ought to have maintained 
reduced trust in the Intangibility Law under the circumstances in 
which it was passed by the Argentine Legislature.174  (It should be 
noted that the Intangibility Law was a general legislative measure, 
not directed to any particular industry or sector, but made 
applicable to all citizens and businesses during the Argentine 
financial crisis as a means of forestalling bank runs and capital 
flight.)  Nevertheless, “[a]s far as the de-dollarization and its 
specific modalities could be considered contrary to any fair and 
equitable treatment standard in light of [Argentina’s] previous 
assurances” and the Intangibility Law, the Tribunal held that 
Argentina could avail of a necessity defence under Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.175  However, with respect to the LETEs worth 
$2.8 million (USD), the Tribunal held that Argentina could not 
invoke the Article XI defense to exculpate itself from liability. 
Similarly drawing on factual investigation of the nature of the 
measures relative to Continental and CNA ART’s circumstances, 
the Tribunal held that Argentina did not breach Article IV 
(prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation) of the U.S.-
 
172 Id. para. 241. 
173 Id. para. 261. 
174 Id. para. 262. 
175 Id. 
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Argentina BIT.  The Tribunal characterized the Capital Control 
Regime measures as non-compensable, or measures that do not 
require indemnification, as they are 
. . . limitations to the use of property in the public interest 
that fall within typical government regulations of property 
entailing mostly inevitable limitations imposed in order to 
ensure the right of others or of the general public . . . .  
These restrictions do not impede the basic, typical use of a 
given asset and do not impose an unreasonable burden on 
the owner . . . [and] are not therefore considered a form of 
expropriation and do not require indemnification.176 
Finally, the Tribunal also rejected Continental’s claim of breach 
of Article II(2)(c) (the umbrella clause), because the clause does not 
come into play when the breach complains of “concerns [mere] 
general obligations arising from the law of the host State.”177 
On this reasoning, the Tribunal ruled that Continental was only 
entitled to payment of compensation in the principal sum of $2.8 
million (USD), representing the principal value of the LETEs at 6 
months LIBOR plus 2 percent compounded annually until 
payment.  The Tribunal rejected Continental’s all other claims 
amounting to approximately $112 million (USD). 
1.4.2. Critique 
The Continental award sets a rather precarious precedent for the 
development of international investment law.  Much of the 
Tribunal’s reasoning on the factual circumstances specific to 
Continental and CNA ART shows that a similar outcome could 
have been reached without the Tribunal’s forced interpretation of 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Unlike the LG&E, CMS Gas, 
and Sempra cases, which involved industry-specific guarantees and 
license-specific contractual terms and arrangements, Continental 
did not have any such assurances at the time that it made its 
investments in CNA ART.  Even during the Argentine financial 
crisis, when Continental and CNA ART were making business 
decisions on whether to maintain their investments in Argentina or 
to transfer them elsewhere, Continental and CNA ART appear to 
have relied only on general political statements by Argentine 
 
176 Id. para. 276. 
177 Id. para. 300 (citation omitted). 
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governmental leaders, and a general legislative measure (the 
Intangibility Law).  These types of assurances were not at all 
determinative of the initial investment decision (as in the LG&E, 
CMS Gas, and Sempra cases), and as such, cannot be so easily 
deserving of protection under various provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  As the Tribunal ultimately found in its extensive 
factual examination of the Capital Control Regime measures in 
relation to Continental’s own actuations, the risk of loss in value of 
Continental’s investment during the Argentine financial crisis was 
not entirely unforeseeable.  Continental’s failure to act prudently to 
preserve the value of its investment, especially given the widely-
known economic climate in the three-year period before and 
during the Argentine financial crisis, cannot translate to 
Argentina’s breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  On the factual 
analysis conducted by the Tribunal, Continental’s claims could 
have been similarly rejected without even reaching a decision on 
the interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Instead, the Tribunal’s interpretation of Article XI created two 
sources of conceptual-methodological problems.  First, the 
Tribunal problematically interpreted Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT in a way that automatically takes out the “necessary 
measure” from the scope and coverage of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 
including the duty to compensate.  Under this interpretation, 
whenever Article XI is found applicable, there would be no duty to 
compensate since none of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT would ever come into force with respect to the 
“necessary measure” in question.  As will be shown below, textual 
reasons, structural design, and policy motivations animating the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT militate against adopting this “exclusionary” 
interpretation of Article XI. 
Second, the Tribunal summarily imported “necessity” concepts 
in distinct legal regimes such as international trade law to 
purposely reach a lower threshold of necessity.  The following 
subsection will also show that not only was it functionally and 
legally inappropriate to cull this standard from international trade 
law, but that the Tribunal also overlooked salient aspects of the 
WTO Appellate Body Report on the Korea-Beef case which the 
Tribunal had cited as its main authoritative basis in support of a 
lower threshold of necessity.  Had the Korea-Beef decision been 
examined more closely in its entirety, however, the Tribunal could 
not have avoided concluding that even under GATT and WTO 
law, the concept of “necessity” is already circumscribed by various 
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contextual qualifications and textual limitations.  In any case, given 
the vastly different respective natures, objects, and purposes of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT and GATT 1947, the Tribunal ought to have 
been constrained by the unitary system of treaty interpretation 
under Article 31 of the VCLT from using Article XX of GATT 1947 
as an interpretive tool to define the substantive content of 
“essential security interests” and “necessary measures” in Article 
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Both these conceptual-methodological problems need not have 
been incurred in the first place.  Their presence in the Continental 
award carries unsettling consequences for the proper 
interpretation of the treaty 
1.4.2. Does Article XI Prevent any Breach of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT from Arising? 
To reiterate, Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT states in its 
entirety: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public 
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the Protection of its own essential security 
interests.178 
The precise wording of Article XI is crucial.  According to the 
Tribunal’s interpretation in the Continental award (and based on an 
earlier view stated by the Ad Hoc Committee in its Decision on the 
Application for Annulment in the CMS Gas case), measures 
embraced under Article XI “would lie outside the scope of the 
Treaty so that the party taking it would not be in breach of the 
relevant BIT provision.”179  This effect, however, is nowhere seen in 
the actual wording of Article XI.  Textually, all that Article XI refers 
to are measures which are not precluded from application by the 
Treaty (“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
Party of measures. . .”).  To “preclude” means to “close,” “rule out in 
advance,” or “make impossible by necessary consequence.”180  
 
178 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
179 Cont’l Cas. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 para. 164. 
180 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary /preclude (emphasis added). 
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Denotatively, therefore, all that Article XI provides for is that the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT does not “close”, “rule out in advance”, or 
“make impossible by necessary consequence” a party’s application 
of measures that are necessary for: (1) “the maintenance of public 
order”; (2) “fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security”; or 
(3) “the protection of [the Party’s] own essential security 
interests.”181  In no case does the text of Article XI even indicate 
what consequences arise when a Party applies such measures.  As 
seen from the very same phraseology of Article XI itself, there is no 
textual support for the Continental Tribunal’s asserted effect of 
Article XI. 
Furthermore, without citing any of the travaux préparatoires of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT in support of its position, the Continental 
Tribunal simply infers that the effect of Article XI is to prevent the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT’s substantive obligations from ever attaching to 
a party whenever it applies the “necessary measures” 
contemplated under Article XI.  A structural analysis of various 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, reveals that the 
state parties to this treaty expressly provided for exceptional 
circumstances when the treaty protections would not apply. 
Article I(2) states the parties’ specific intent to deny the 
protections and/or advantages of the U.S.-Argentina BIT in strictly 
limited circumstances: 
Each party reserves the right to deny to any company of the 
other Party the advantages of this Treaty if (a) nationals of 
any third country, or nationals of such Party, control such 
company and the company has no substantial business 
activities in the territory of the other Party, or (b) the 
company is controlled by nationals of a third country with 
which the denying Party does not maintain normal 
economic relations.182 
Article II(1) reserves the right of each party to expressly create 
exceptions to the U.S.-Argentina BIT’s standard of treatment, 
under an agreed and transparent procedure: 
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities 
associated therewith, on a basis no less favourable than that 
 
181 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
182 Id. art. I(2). 
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accorded in like situations to investment or associated 
activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals 
or companies of any third country, whichever is the more 
favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or 
maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or 
matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty.  Each Party 
agrees to notify the other Party before or on the date of 
entry into force of this Treaty of all such laws and 
regulations of which it is aware concerning the sectors or 
matters listed in the Protocol.  Moreover, each Party agrees 
to notify the other of any future exception with respect to 
the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol, and to limit 
such exceptions to a minimum.  Any future exception by 
either Party shall not apply to investment existing in that 
sector or matter at the time the exception becomes effective.  
The treatment accorded pursuant to any exceptions shall, 
unless specified otherwise in the Protocol, be not less 
favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investments and associated activities of nationals or 
companies of any third country.183 
Article II(9) explicitly indicates the denial of application of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT’s most favored nation (“MFN”) provisions to 
certain benefits conferred under existing regional or institutional 
arrangements: 
The most favored nation provisions of this Article shall not 
apply to advantages accorded by either Party to nationals 
or companies of any third country by virtue of that Party’s 
binding obligations that derive from full membership in a 
regional customs union or free trade area, whether such an 
arrangement is designated as a customs union, free trade 
area, common market or otherwise.184 
Article IV(3) illustrates the state parties’ intent to avoid a 
situation of denying substantive protection even for investment 
 
183 Id. art. II(1). 
184 Id. art. II(9). 
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losses arising from “national emergencies,” by instead mandating 
states parties to provide for non-discriminatory treatment:185 
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments 
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war 
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national 
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar 
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no 
less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or 
companies or to nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as 
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.186 
Article IX specifies the inapplicability of Articles VII and VIII of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT for certain classes of disputes: 
The provisions of Article VII and VIII shall not apply to a 
dispute arising (a) under the export credit, guarantee or 
insurance programs of the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States or (b) under other official credit, guarantee or 
insurance arrangements pursuant to which the Parties have 
agreed to other means of settling disputes.187 
The foregoing provisions show that the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT contemplated departures from the substantive 
obligations provided for in the treaty as an exceptional 
circumstance, and one that requires specification in the language of 
the treaty itself.  The failure to provide for a clause stipulating the 
effect of a party’s application of measures under Article XI raises a 
justifiable implication that neither of the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT envisaged a situation where the treaty would be 
completely inappropriate, so as to prevent any of its substantive 
protections from taking effect.  Had the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT intended otherwise, the text of Article XI should 
have been explicitly worded to provide for the effect of treaty 
inapplicability.  This is reasonably consonant with the posture 
 
185 For conclusions reached under a similarly-worded provision in the United 
Kingdom-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, see BG Group PLC v. Argentina 
(U.K. v. Arg.), Final Award, paras. 381–84 (Dec. 24, 2007) (discussing national 
treatment and most favored nation requirements under a provision of the U.K.-
Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty). 
186 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. IV(3). 
187 Id. art. IX. 
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taken by both treaty parties, who had—in the afore-cited treaty 
provisions—so meticulously specified the limitations and 
parameters of exemption from the applicability of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT’s substantive obligations. 
Significantly, the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT is likewise 
silent on the effect of a party’s application of measures under 
Article XI.  Paragraph 6 of the Protocol clarifies the substantive 
content of a clause in Article XI, but does not indicate the effect of 
the application of any such measure under Article XI: “The Parties 
understand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the 
Treaty, ‘obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace or security’ means obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations.”188 
The fact that the parties purposely chose not to indicate in the 
Protocol any effect of a party’s application of a measure under 
Article XI can be contradistinguished from the first five clauses of 
the Protocol, which refer expressly to the parties’ respective 
reservation of rights to create exceptions from substantive 
obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.189  The treaty parties’ 
failure to provide for the effect of a host state’s application of 
measures under Article XI should therefore be seen as the treaty 
parties’ rejection of the absolute inapplicability of the treaty with 
 
188 Id. protocol para. 6. 
189 See Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT: 
During dispute settlement proceedings pursuant to Article VII, a party 
may be required to produce evidence of ownership or control consistent 
with Article I(1)(a). 
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right 
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following 
sectors . . . 
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right 
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment with respect to 
certain programs involving government grants, loans, and insurance. 
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right 
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national and most favoured nation 
treatment in the following sectors, with respect to which the treatment 
will be based on reciprocity . . . 
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, Argentina reserves the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following 
sectors . . . . 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, protocol paras. 1–5 (emphasis added). 
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respect to measures embraced by Article XI.  Doubt as to the intent 
of the treaty parties should be construed in favor of the 
interpretation which better upholds the “object and purpose” of 
the treaty, and does not thwart its substantive application.190  It is 
reasonable to conclude that parties to a treaty intended its 
application, unless deliberately excluded as seen in the afore-cited 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Finally, attention must also be directed to Article III of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT: 
This Treaty shall not preclude either Party from prescribing 
laws and regulations in connection with the admission of 
investments made in its territory by nationals or companies 
of the other Party or with the conduct of associated 
activities, provided, however, that such laws and 
regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the 
rights set forth in the Treaty.191 
The foregoing provision is the only other provision in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT that, like Article XI, indicates acts which are not 
precluded by the treaty.  As the phraseology of Article III makes 
clear, non-preclusion does not mean that the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
does not apply to certain acts of a treaty party.  Rather, non-
preclusion merely connotes that a treaty party is not prevented 
from committing certain acts even within the operative duration of 
the treaty.  Article III’s proviso (“provided, however, that such laws 
and regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the rights set 
forth in the Treaty”), however, expressly restricts the effects of a 
party’s acts against impairment of substantive rights under the 
treaty.  While this proviso is not present in the wording of Article 
XI, all that the absence implies is that the measures contemplated 
under Article XI could conceivably impair substantive rights under 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  However, it cannot extend to an 
implication (which the Tribunal in the Continental Award 
problematically made) that a treaty party’s application of measures 
 
190 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331; see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 474-562 (2006); see generally Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 1 (1951) 
(discussing theories of treaty interpretation). 
191 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. III (emphasis added). 
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under Article XI automatically removes the right to compensation 
under various provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Clearly, textual and structural analysis of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT does not support the Continental Tribunal’s broad 
interpretation of Article XI to prevent a breach from ever arising 
when a host State implements “necessary measures,” to the point 
that the host State would never have any duty to compensate for 
such measures when they impair substantive rights under the 
treaty.  As will be further shown in Section 2 and Section 3, a 
rigorous application of the lex specialis under Article XI in relation 
to other substantive provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT should 
still militate in favour of maintaining the right to compensation as 
manifest from the treaty’s text, structural design, and policy 
motivations. 
1.4.3. Are GATT and WTO Law and Jurisprudence Legally 
Relevant in Determining the Substantive Content of Article 
XI? 
The Continental Tribunal justified its reference to GATT and 
WTO case law on the claim that “the text of Article XI derives from 
the parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties 
in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947.”192  The 
Tribunal then primarily relied on the WTO Appellate Body Report 
on the Korea-Beef case, to infer a lower threshold of necessity under 
Article XI to mean “whether the [Capital Control Regime] 
Measures contributed materially to the realization of their 
legitimate aims under Article XI of the BIT,”193 and “whether 
Argentina had reasonably available alternatives, less in conflict or 
more compliant with its international obligations, while providing 
an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective 
pursued.”194 
The sudden resort to GATT and WTO case law is 
unprecedented, not having been referred to at all by previous 
ICSID tribunals in the Sempra, LG & E, and CMS Gas cases that also 
interpreted Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  As reflected from 
the Continental Tribunal’s own proferred justification, Article XI 
 
192 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, para. 192 
(Sept. 5, 2008). 
193 Id. para. 196. 
194 Id. para. 198 (citation omitted). 
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only remotely derives from Article XX of GATT 1947 through the 
parallel model clause of the US FCN treaties.  However, nowhere 
in the Continental Award did the Tribunal show that Article XX of 
GATT 1947 had formed part of the travaux preparatoires of the 
parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and if so, the precise degree in 
which Article XX of GATT 1947 had been relied upon during the 
negotiation and drafting of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
More importantly, the textual nexus between Article XX of 
GATT 1947 and Article XI appears more imagined than real.  The 
full text of Article XX of GATT 1947 states, in full:   
 
 
Article XX:  General Exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
a) necessary to protect public morals; 
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold 
or silver; 
d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including those 
relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II 
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices; 
e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
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g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption; 
h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any 
intergovernmental commodity agreement which 
conforms to criteria submitted to the Contracting 
Parties and not disapproved by them or which is 
itself so submitted and not so disapproved; 
i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic 
materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of 
such materials to a domestic processing industry 
during periods when the domestic price of such 
materials is held below the world price as part of a 
governmental stabilization plan; provided that such 
restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports 
of or the protection afforded to such domestic 
industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of 
this Agreement relating to non-discrimination; 
j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of 
products in general or local short supply; provided 
that any such measures shall be consistent with the 
principle that all contracting parties are entitled to 
an equitable share of the international supply of 
such products, and that any such measures, which 
are inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the 
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.  
The Contracting Parties shall review the need for 
this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.195 
Nowhere in the text of Article XX of GATT 1947 is there 
language that reproduces Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
Article XI’s “This Treaty shall not preclude . . . .” is in no way a 
denotative equivalent for Article XX’s “nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
 
195 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e 
/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX. 
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contracting party of measures . . . .”  Mere “non-preclusion” in 
Article XI is not conceptually tantamount or analogous to “non-
construction to prevent adoption or enforcement” under Article 
XX. 
Obviously, the two-tiered structure of Article XX in its chapeau 
(“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade . . . .”) and the ten items enumerated from (a) to (j) is facially 
absent from the actual wording of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.196  Raj Bhala describes Article XX’s drafting history to have 
been motivated by the desire to meet particular conditions existing 
in specific countries in construing exceptions from multilateral 
trade obligations under the GATT.197  The chapeau is intended to 
guard against the abusive interpretation of any of the itemized 
exceptions: 
 
196 Id. 
197 RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS 
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 531–33 (2005). 
All GATT obligations are subject to a set of 10 general exceptions set 
forth in Article XX.  This ‘laundry list,’ albeit incomplete, generates some 
of the most hotly and frequently debated problems in the multilateral 
trading system . . . . Conceptually, it is a folly to think a single theory 
underpins these seven exceptions, much less all 10 of them . . . . Indeed, 
in the 1946 London and 1947 Geneva Preparatory Conferences, no effort 
was made to develop a coherent theoretical basis unifying the items on 
Article XX . . . . Rather, self-interested expediency mattered to the 
drafters of GATT, as Professor Jackson observes: ‘Naturally, the 
tendency of the drafting sessions [of both Articles XX and XXI], as was 
the case for other articles, was to add to the list of general exceptions in 
order to meet the particular conditions existing in specific countries.’ 
 . . . . Pessimism aside, the starting point for the international trade 
lawyer and scholar needing to come to terms with Article XX is the 
language of the text.  Despite the lack of a unifying theory, there is one 
unifying aspect to that text, namely, its introductory clause, known as the 
chapeau . . . . [Which] concerns not the aim or design of a measure, but 
rather the way in which a measure is applied.  Simply put, the purpose 
of the chapeau is to prevent the abusive invocation of an itemised 
exception.  This concern helps make it a unifying force for the 10 
itemised exceptions.  The purpose of the chapeau is what makes it a 
device uniting all 10 exceptions in Article XX, other than the textual fact 
it is an introduction to them. 
Id. 
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The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the 
exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of 
legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or 
defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under 
the substantive rule of the General Agreement.  If those 
exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, 
the measures falling within the particular exceptions must 
be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal 
duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal 
rights of the other parties concerned.198 
The particular phraseology of the chapeau in Article XX: 
[E]mbodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of 
the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations 
between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of 
the exceptions under Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) 
to (j), on the other hand, and the substantive rights of the 
other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.199 
The absence of a textual nexus between Article XX of GATT 
1947 and Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is easily explained by 
the disparate design and policy motivation behind the respective 
legal regimes.  GATT binds Member States to comply with 
multilaterally-negotiated rules in the international trade system, 
such as those pertaining to tariffs (including schedules, modalities, 
and bindings), non-tariff barriers (such as those on limits on and 
administration of quantitative restrictions), and customs (including 
rules on transit and origin, valuation and fees), among others.  A 
Member State to the GATT can only invoke Article XX under 
narrow circumstances and conditions to justify a measure that is 
inconsistent with the State’s affirmative obligations under GATT.200  
 
198 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 22, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29, 1996), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/a1s1p1 
_e.htm. 
199 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶156, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998). 
200 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 599 (2005). 
In general, Article XX is relevant and will be invoked by a Member only 
when a measure of that Member has been found to be inconsistent with 
another GATT provision.  In such a case, Article XX will be invoked to 
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Whenever a Member State’s measure is deemed to be GATT-
inconsistent, the GATT’s system of dispute settlement under 
Articles XXII and XXIII (and later, the WTO’s Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes or 
DSU) come into play: 
Article XXII: Consultation 
1) Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic 
consideration to, and shall afford adequate 
opportunity for consultation regarding, such 
representations as may be made by another 
contracting party with respect to any matter 
affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
2) The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a 
contracting party, consult with any contracting 
party or parties in respect of any matter for which it 
has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution 
through consultation under paragraph 1. 
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment 
1) If any contracting party should consider that any 
benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the 
 
justify the GATT-inconsistent measure.  As the Panel in US-Section 337 
noted, the central phrase in the first sentence of Article XX is that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures . . . .”  Measures satisfying the 
conditions set out in Article XX are thus permitted, even if they are 
inconsistent with other provisions of the GATT 1994.  As noted by the 
Panel in US-Section 337, Article XX provides, however, for limited and 
conditional exceptions from obligations under other GATT provisions.  The 
exceptions are “limited” as the list of exceptions in Article XX is 
exhaustive.  The exceptions are “conditional” in that Article XX only 
provides for justification of an otherwise illegal measure when the 
conditions set out in Article XX . . . are fulfilled.  While Article XX allows 
Members to adopt or maintain measures promoting or protecting other 
important societal values, it provides an exception to, or limitation of, 
affirmative commitments under GATT 1994.  In this light, it is not 
surprising that Article XX has played a central role in many GATT and 
WTO disputes. 
Id. 
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attainment of any objective of the Agreement is 
being impeded as the result of 
(a) The failure of another contracting party to 
carry out its obligations under this 
Agreement, or 
(b) The application by another contracting party 
of any measure, whether or not it conflicts 
with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
(c) The existence of any other situation,the 
contracting party may, with a view to the 
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make 
written representations or proposals to the 
other contracting party or parties which it 
considers to be concerned.  Any contracting 
party thus approached shall give 
sympathetic consideration to the 
representations or proposals made to it. 
2) If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the 
contracting parties concerned within a reasonable 
time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in 
paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be 
referred to the Contracting Parties.  The Contracting 
Parties shall promptly investigate any matter so 
referred to them and shall make appropriate 
recommendations to the contracting parties which 
they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on 
the matter, as appropriate. The Contracting Parties 
may consult with contracting parties, with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
and with any appropriate inter-governmental 
organization in cases where they consider such 
consultation necessary. If the Contracting Parties 
consider that the circumstances are serious enough 
to justify such action, they may authorize a 
contracting party or parties to suspend the 
application to any other contracting party or parties 
of such concessions or other obligations under this 
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in 
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the circumstances. If the application to any 
contracting party of any concession or other 
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting 
party shall then be free, not later than sixty days 
after such action is taken, to give written notice to 
the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of 
its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and 
such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth 
day following the day on which such notice is 
received by him.201 
As the foregoing provisions show, the remedy contemplated 
under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system is the 
realignment of a Member State’s questioned measure (whether 
found to constitute a “violation nullification or impairment,” or, in 
rare instances, a “non-violation nullification or impairment”)202 
back to consistency and compliance with GATT obligations.  
Unlike the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the GATT does not provide for 
compensation as a remedy for breach of substantive obligations.  
Conversely, the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not provide for the 
removal of a government measure in the manner followed in the 
GATT system. 
On the other hand, the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
negotiated and concluded the treaty in order to “maintain a stable 
framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic 
resources.”203  In the event of direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization, the treaty regime specifically provided for a duty 
to pay “prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”204  
Compensation was further characterized as that which is 
 
201 GATT 1947, supra note 195, arts. xxii-xxiii. 
202 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 190, at 1152–56.  A “violation nullification or 
impairment” involves a trade measure that, on its face, nullifies or impairs 
benefits under the General Agreement.  A “non-violation nullification or 
impairment,” on the other hand, involves a Member State’s implementation of a 
lawful measure in a manner that denies or disrupts trade benefits of the 
complaining Member as negotiated under the GATT.  Id.  See also C. O’Neal 
Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L 309 (2007); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the 
WTO, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 631 (2007); Hal S. Shapiro, The Rules that Swallowed the 
Exceptions: The WTO SPS Agreement and its Relationship to GATT Articles XX and 
XXI, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 199 (2007). 
203 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl. 
204 Id. art. IV(1). 
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equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the expropriatory action 
was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid 
without delay; include interest at a commercially 
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be fully 
realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing 
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.205 
The treaty structure, object and purpose, as well as the policy 
animating the GATT vastly differ from that of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  Textual differences accompany the patent structural disparity 
between the one-sentence Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and 
the two-tiered structure of chapeau and listed exceptions in Article 
XX of GATT 1947.  The word “necessary” in Article XX is qualified 
by specific objects and/or qualificatory clauses (e.g. “necessary to 
protect public morals”; “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”; “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement”) that are not found in the terminology of Article XI of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT (e.g. “necessary for the maintenance of 
public order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
Protection of its own essential security interests.”).  The GATT 
provision which might have the closer linkage with the objects of 
“maintenance of public order” or “essential security interests” in 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is Article XXI of GATT 1947, 
entitled “Security Exceptions.”  Even then, however, the textual 
formulation and limited application of Article XXI remains vastly 
different from the wording of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT: 
Article XXI: Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to 
furnish any information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to its 
essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from 
taking any action which it considers 
 
205 Id. 
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necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests; 
i. relating to fissionable materials or the 
materials from which they are 
derived; 
ii. relating to the traffic in arms, 
ammunition and implements of war 
and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment; 
iii. taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations; 
or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from 
taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.206 
As seen above, the nature of measures “necessary for 
protecting essential security interests” in Article XXI of GATT 1947 
is qualified by subparagraphs (b)(i) through b(iii).207  None of these 
qualifications are found in the brief language of Article XI. 
 
206 GATT 1947, supra note 195, art. XXI (emphasis added). 
207 See Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine 
or Political Excuse?, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 135, 139–40 (2008). 
For this first “occasion,” the security exceptions negotiated the politically 
charged “discursive space” between the WTO’s legal authority and the 
retention of sovereign power by members.  In this sense, the security 
exceptions operate as a dual political excuse.  The WTO, as an institution, 
is wary that WTO membership “erodes states” control over cross-border 
flows’ and thus, state sovereignty.  A state’s participation therefore 
became dependent on reserving their sovereign rights of power over 
national security.  Members essentially seek confirmation that their 
security interests supersede trade obligations.  This first manifestation is 
a sovereign excuse that appears to function “as a description of the 
[members’] norm.”  That is, Realism’s view that security is a political 
issue solely for state determination. 
Secondly, security exceptions operate as a facilitative, institutional excuse.  
They allow the WTO and its Agreements to ‘walk the fine line between 
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Finally, it was likewise erroneous and methodologically 
inappropriate for the Continental Tribunal to simply lift 
jurisprudential tests developed by the WTO Appellate Body in 
relation to Article XX of GATT 1947 in order to expand the 
substantive content of “essential security interests” or “necessary” 
measures under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  In particular, 
the Continental Tribunal quoted a passage from the Korea-Beef case 
as an authoritative principle for the Tribunal to define “necessary 
measures” in Article XI as a process of assessing “whether the 
[Capital Control Regime] Measures contributed materially to the 
realization of their legitimate aims under Art. XI of the BIT, namely 
the protection of the essential security interests of Argentina in the 
economic and social crisis it was facing.”208  Had the Continental 
Tribunal quoted the entire passage from the Korea-Beef decision, 
however, it could not have avoided the conclusion that the term 
“necessary” in Article XX is context-dependent and cannot simply 
be transplanted into Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.209 
 
these two competing concerns’ of sovereignty and authority.  States are 
induced, and justify, entering the regime believing their “essential security 
interests”, which demand great domestic political responsibility, will be 
protected.  Conceptually, therefore, security exceptions are the necessary 
“escape clause” used to expedite the conclusion of Agreements, while 
binding members to their WTO obligations.  Pragmatism requires the 
appearance of the WTO circumscribing its decision-making authority, 
while the states’ political power seemingly exists “despite [the] 
institution’s rules or norms.”  Therefore, by including security 
exceptions, states are encouraged to consent to WTO membership, 
underpinning the WTO’s negotiated legitimacy. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
208 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, para. 196 
(Sep. 5, 2008). 
209 In paragraph 193 of the Continental Award, the Tribunal cited an excerpt 
from paragraph 161 of the Korea-Beef decision.  The entire paragraph is set forth 
below: 
We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the 
word “necessary” is not limited to that which is “indispensable” or “of 
absolute necessity” or “inevitable.”  Measures which are indispensable or 
of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil 
the requirements of Article XX(d).  But other measures, too, may fall 
within the ambit of this exception.  As used in Article XX(d), the term 
“necessary” refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity.  At one 
end of this continuum lies “necessary” understood as “indispensable”; at 
the other, is “necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to.”  
We consider that a “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located 
significantly closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the opposite 
pole of simply “making a contribution to.” 
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Given the textual, structural, and policy incompatibilities 
between Article XX of GATT 1947 and Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, there appears to have been no legal relevance for 
the Continental Tribunal to conflate “necessity” concepts as 
understood in relation to Article XX with “necessary measures” as 
discussed in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  The Tribunal did 
not cite any travaux preparatoires, prior practice or subsequent 
agreement of the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT to make Article 
XX an authoritative interpretive source for Article XI.  Accordingly, 
this particular methodology in Continental should not be seen as a 
useful adjudicative precedent for the development of international 
investment law.  If followed by other investment arbitration 
tribunals, the two conceptual-methodological problems identified 
in the preceding Sections are likely to wreak interpretive havoc on 
future cases.  With many bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties carrying provisions worded similarly to Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, a tribunal’s inability to thoroughly justify the 
choice of interpretive methodology opens the international legal 
regime to criticisms of arbitrariness, lack of rule of law, instability 
and unpredictability of legal outcomes.  Under the Continental 
Tribunal’s interpretive practice, the importance of text as a key 
source of meaning can be negated by extraneous considerations 
and policies set by third-party arbitrators.  “Context” can be 
loosely used to fit every legal standard, from any legal regime 
whatsoever, so long as a tribunal deems it “relevant” to defining 
the substantive content of a treaty.  This interpretive practice 
altogether undermines the duty to observe the unitary system of 
treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT. 
Ultimately, the source of controversy in the Continental Award 
is its interpretive methodology.  Based only on its extensive 
evaluation of the facts in relation to Argentina’s substantive treaty 
obligations, the Continental Tribunal could conceivably have 
arrived at the same result without complicating the interpretation 
of Article XI.  The problematic interpretive methodology in 
Continental trenches both the concept and consequence of 
“necessity” under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  It is also a 
problem of process—and the extent to which a tribunal or 
arbitrator can reach into the spectrum of international legal sources 
 
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and 
Frozen Beef, para. 161, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000). 
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to set definitive interpretive tools.  Section 2 explores these 
conceptual-methodological issues further, situating the 
controversy to the use of the customary norm of necessity as a 
“supplementary” means of interpreting the lex specialis of Article XI 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN USING THE 
CUSTOMARY NORM OF NECESSITY AS A “SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF 
INTERPRETATION” OF ARTICLE XI AS THE LEX SPECIALIS 
The foregoing analysis of the Sempra, LG & E, CMS Gas, and 
Continental cases has shown that the customary norm of necessity 
has permeated judicial interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT to varying degrees.  Whether considered as part of 
the treaty’s “context” or a “relevant rule of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” under Article 31 of 
the VCLT, or as a “supplementary means of interpretation” under 
Article 32 of the VCLT, it must first be ascertained whether a legal-
conceptual relationship could even exist between Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT and the doctrine of necessity in customary 
international law (as codified by Article 25 of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility).  As the lex specialis, Article XI takes 
precedence as the operative rule in investment controversies 
brought under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.210  Any normative weight 
 
210 See Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: 
The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27, 30, 39 (2005) (arguing that 
although lex specialis may be effective in resolving certain normative conflicts, it 
may be less appropriate for dealing with new conflicts created by the 
fragmentation of international law); NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND 
REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–20 
(1994). 
It is often necessary to decide which of several conflicting rules of 
international law deriving from the same or different sources and being 
in force at a particular time must apply to a given situation.  In the 
literature three criteria are used to solve conflicts of this kind: the 
normative value of the conflicting rules, their relative degree of 
generality, and the chronological order of their generation. 
According to these criteria, the rule which has a higher normative value 
(lex superior) will prevail.  This will be the case when one of the rules 
has the character of jus cogens.  If the conflicting rules are all expressions 
of equal authority, then the rule which is more recent (lex posterior) or 
more specific (lex specialis) will prevail.  A rule can be regarded as lex 
specialis, because it is binding on a few States as opposed to a rule 
binding erga omnes (lex specialis ratione personae) or because it “furnishes, 
in comparison with the lex generalis, the deeper, more detailed, perhaps 
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attributable to Article 25 could therefore only be in a 
supplementary sense to Article XI.  As this Section contends, 
however, fundamental conceptual and methodological 
incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI undercut the 
former norm’s relevance in interpreting the latter norm.  The 
following subsections juxtapose various aspects of the underlying 
incompatibilities between the norms.211  Considering the distinct 
normative development of the doctrine of “necessity” under 
customary international law, the concluding subsection disputes 
the presumed existence of a legal-conceptual relationship between 
Article XI and Article 25, and argues that Article 25 cannot be 
accepted as an interpretive tool for Article XI within the framework 
of operative rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. 
2.1. Nature of Measures Contemplated 
“Necessity” under Article 25 contemplates a State’s 
commission of a measure or act that is admittedly “not in 
conformity with an international obligation.”  When a State pleads 
necessity, therefore, there is already a situation of extant 
wrongfulness arising from the State’s act.  Necessity functions as 
an affirmative defense against the State’s responsibility for acting 
in breach of an international obligation.  Hugo Grotius, credited 
with developing the doctrine of necessity, discussed the origin of 
this particular affirmative defense from “certain premises of 
human impulse and external circumstances [in which] man has 
been compelled to resort to certain rules.”212  In the Gabčikovo-
 
exceptional, regulation of the same subject-matte”‘ (lex specialis ratione 
materiae). 
Id. 
211 See also W. Michael Reisman, Professor, Yale Law School, Fifteenth Goff: 
Arbitration Lecture: National Emergencies and Necessities: Do They and Should 
They Relieve States of Their Investment Obligations (Oct. 7, 2008) (discussing 
problems of dealing with business disputes through public international law) (on 
file with author). 
212 BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 7–10 (1928). 
We have said that Grotius more than anyone else deserves to be 
considered the modern founder of the doctrine of necessity. . . .  It should 
not, however, detract from the fact that Machiavelli, writing 115 years 
earlier, without aiming at a systematic presentation of the subject matter, 
and proceeding from entirely different premises, nevertheless had 
arrived at conclusions that bear a startling similarity to those of 
Grotius. . . . 
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Nagymaros case, the International Court of Justice adopted the 
International Law Commission’s characterization of the customary 
doctrine of necessity as “deeply rooted in general legal 
thinking.”213 
The modern concept of necessity under Article 25, however, 
does not recognize the existence of “an omnibus category” of State 
acts or measures.214  Judicial decisions cited by the International 
Law Commission (ILC)215 in which the plea of necessity has been 
applied include State measures involving the use of force216 and its 
incidents,217 provisional prohibitions or restrictions on commercial 
activities,218 and delayed repayment of monetary obligations.219  
 
In estimating the part played by Machiavelli in developing the doctrine 
of necessity it is sufficient to repeat that he antedated Grotius by more 
than one hundred years in pointing out that in order to excuse the use of 
necessity, there must be a real danger to the life and property of the state 
and that the amount of force to be employed should be no greater than is 
essential to defend the particular rights in danger.   
213 Gabĉîkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept. 
25). 
214 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 448 (6th 
ed. 2003) (explaining that while some defenses such as assumption of risk or 
contributory negligence are commonly accepted in international tribunals, 
necessity may only be pleaded in narrower contexts). 
215 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assemly, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 80–84 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 80–84 [hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States]. 
216 See id. at 81 (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 5) (discussing the “Caroline” incident of 
1837). 
217 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 4) (discussing an Anglo-Portuguese dispute of 
1832 involving the appropriation of private property in order to provide 
subsistence for certain troop contingents quelling internal disturbances and the 
March 1967 bombing of the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon by the British 
government to prevent further spillage of large amounts of oil threatening the 
English coastline). 
218 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 6)  (addressing the Russian Fur Seals 
controversy of 1893, where the Russian government issued a decree prohibiting 
sealing in an area of the high seas) (citing Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 
1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4)). 
219 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 7)  (discussing the Ottoman Empire’s use of 
force majeure to justify its delay in payment of debt to Russia); Beate Rudolf and 
Nina Hüfken, Argentinean State Bonds—Defense of Necessity in Relationship Between 
State and Private Debtors—Customary International Law and General Principles of Law, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 857 (2007) (summarizing the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s May 8, 2007 ruling that “no discernible, general rule of 
public international law enables a state to invoke the doctrine of necessity as a 
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According to the ILC, state practice and judicial decisions support 
the use of the necessity justification for “acts contrary to a broad 
range of obligations, whether customary or conventional in 
origin,” and the doctrine “has been invoked to protect a wide 
variety of interests, including safeguarding the environment, 
preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time of 
public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian 
population.”220 
In contrast to Article 25, the text of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT merely specifies the classes of measures 
contemplated (“measures necessary for the maintenance of public 
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
Protection of its own essential security interests”),221 without 
stating that any of these measures would automatically be in 
breach of the treaty, or call for a suspension of treaty obligations.  
Applying the ejusdem generis rule of treaty interpretation,222 the 
parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT can only commit such measures 
that fall within these limited classes—those which fall within the 
same genus as “public order,” “international peace or security,” or 
“essential security interests.”  The treaty-defined genus appears 
more limited than the Article 25 formulation, since Article XI’s 
specified classes of measures presuppose immediacy, urgency, and 
 
justification for suspending the performance of obligations now due and arising 
under private law to pay private creditors”). 
220 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 83 (Draft Art. 
25, cmt. 14). 
221 U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
222 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 110 (July 22) 
(discussing when facts forming the subject matter of a dispute may relate to a 
treaty); Ambatielos Claim (U.K. v. Greece), 12 R. Int’l Arb. Awards. 83, 106 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1956) (debating the interpretation of the most-favored nation clause); ULF 
LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 303 
(2007): 
According to many authors in the literature, a treaty shall be interpreted 
through application of the principle of ejusdem generis.  In my judgment, 
this is sufficient reason for us to conclude that the principle is a valid rule 
of international law.  However, the question is still what the principle 
stands for —in the literature, authors seem to think this obvious.  The 
only real explanation offered by the literature is the following: The 
ejusdem generis doctrine is to the effect that general words when 
following (or sometimes preceding) special words are limited to the 
genus, if any, indicated by the special words. 
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directness in the measures to be applied by a State.  This militates 
against adopting an Article 25 interpretation that favors a “wide 
variety of interests” in construing “necessity.”  Had the parties to 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT desired an Article 25-type provision to 
cover the kinds of State acts or measures described under Article 
XI, there ought to have been more analogous textual formulation to 
that effect in the phraseology of Article XI.  The absence of Article 
25-type language in Article XI weighs against extending Article XI 
coverage to every conceivable State act or measure as a 
“necessary” measure.223 
Ultimately, what is of signal importance for a measure to be 
deemed “necessary” under Article XI are the three qualifying 
classes defined under its common genus of immediacy, urgency, 
and directness to State interest in survival: (1) maintenance of 
public order; (2) fulfilment of international obligations with respect 
to the maintenance of international peace and security; and (3) 
essential security interests.224  The parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
further defined the second qualifying class in the Protocol to the 
treaty as: 
“The Parties understand that, with respect to rights reserved in 
Article XI of the Treaty, ‘obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security’ 
means obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.”225 
Two observations can be made from the parties’ deliberate 
specification of meaning for this class of obligations.  The first is 
that the parties intended that the genus of Article XI “necessary” 
measures should approximate states’ interests of fundamental 
 
223 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 447–48 (2008). 
However, in our reading, the status of necessity in customary 
international law cannot be broader than the narrowest formulations 
included in explicit treaty language, and these are clearly neither open-
ended nor entirely self-judging. On the general proposition that drafters 
do not include meaningless language in treaties, permissive wording 
would be included in a treaty only if it were thought necessary to 
overcome a background presumption against a broad interpretation of 
the doctrine.  
Id.  
224 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
225 Protocol to the Treaty Between The United States of America and The 
Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, para. 6, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–2 (emphasis 
added). 
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importance such as obligations under the UN Charter.  The second 
is that the parties’ silence on the definition of the first and third 
qualifying classes should lean towards an interpretation that is not 
only comparable to the importance with which parties view UN 
Charter obligations, but also, that silence should be interpreted 
towards the option least restrictive of rights provided for under the 
treaty.  Simply stated, the parties’ omission in the Protocol to 
correspondingly clarify what “maintenance of public order” or 
“essential security interests” mean should not be construed against 
the parties’ expressed will of giving effect to the substantive 
obligations in the treaty.226  Both observations argue against 
applying an Article 25-type expansive reading of measures 
(involving a “wide variety of interests”) to the carefully-phrased 
language of Article XI.  As will be shown in Section 2.3., this 
conceptual divide will likewise affect the respective remedial 
consequences available under Article 25 and Article XI. 
2.2. Conditions for Application 
Article 25 sets distinct and conjugated conditions before a 
State’s measure could be justified under “necessity” as a ground 
precluding wrongfulness.  For a State to be able to properly invoke 
“necessity”, Article 25(1) imposes two positive conditions both of 
which must be fulfilled: (1) the State’s act or measure is “the only 
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril”; and (2) that such act or measure “does not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a 
whole.”227 
 
226 See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 953, 970 (1994) (explaining that treaty interpretation should reflect 
the intent of the parties); 74 AM. JUR. 2d Treaties § 31 (2001) (requring that in 
interpreting a treaty, words “be given their natural and ordinary significance” 
unless the words are ambiguous or obscure).  For a proposal of a clear statement 
rule that avoids implying a remedy unless parties express an unmistakable intent 
to provide for such remedy in the treaty, see Ryan D. Newman, Treaty Rights and 
Remedies: The Virtues of A Clear Statement Rule, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 419, 447 
(2007); see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945–1986 
60 (1989) (“[T]he exact language of the treaty provision in question must always 
be carefully scrutinized and analysed before the conclusion is reached that the 
provision is truly mandatory and not merely exhortatory or optative.”). 
227 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art. 
25). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
900 U. Pa. J. Int’l. L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
As to the first condition, the International Law Commission 
(“ILC”) expounds that 
The extent to which a given interest is “essential” depends 
on all the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged.  It 
extends to particular interests of the State and its people, as 
well as of the international community as a whole.  
Whatever the interest may be, however, it is only when it is 
threatened by a grave and imminent peril that this 
condition is satisfied.  The peril has to be objectively 
established and not merely apprehended as possible.  In 
addition to being grave, the peril has to be imminent in the 
sense of proximate. . . . 
The word “way”å in paragraph 1 (a) is not limited to 
unilateral action but may also comprise other forms of 
conduct available through cooperative action with other 
States or through international organizations (for example, 
the conservation measures for a fishery taken through the 
competent regional fisheries agency).  Moreover, the 
requirement of necessity is inherent in the plea: any 
conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the 
purpose will not be covered.228 
Broad categories of “essential interests” considered by the ILC 
in varying degrees include, among others, the existence of the 
state, political or economic survival, continued functioning of the 
state’s essential services, maintenance of internal peace, survival of 
a sector of the state’s population, and the preservation of the 
environment of the state’s territory or a part thereof.229 
As to the second condition, the ILC emphasized that “the 
interest relied on must outweigh all other considerations, not 
merely from the point of view of the acting State but on a 
reasonable assessment of the competing interests, whether these 
are individual or collective.”230  This condition underscores the 
higher relative weight of the interest being served by the State act 
 
228 Id. at 83 (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 15). 
229 See Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 502–03 (2004) (discussing the difficulty the ILC had in trying 
to “spell out” and “lay down pre-established categories of interests). 
230 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art. 
25, cmt. 17). 
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or measure in question, as opposed to all other interests existing at 
the point in time that the act or measure is devised and 
implemented. 
The joint effect of the positive conditions under Article 25(1) is 
to create potentially the most difficult standard for a State to 
exculpate itself from responsibility on the ground of necessity.  
(Indeed, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision, the 
International Court of Justice held that Hungary’s claimed concern 
for potential ecological impacts arising from the project did not 
meet the high objective standard of a “grave and imminent peril” 
under Article 25.231  Apart from these positive conditions, however, 
Article 25(2) further imposes two separate negative conditions. 
Neither of these conditions should prevail, otherwise, the State 
cannot avail of the necessity defense: (1) “the international 
obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity”; or (2) “the State has contributed to the situation of 
necessity.”232 
The cumulative result of the above positive and negative 
conditions to Article 25 is to make the necessity defence only 
narrowly or exceptionally available to States.  This was purposely 
intended by the ILC when it codified the customary normative 
status of necessity in the Draft Articles of State Responsibility, 
precisely in order to delimit and prevent the norm from following 
the loose contours of the ancient maxim necessitas non habet legem 
(“Necessity knows no law”), on which States’ opposition to the 
norm had been based.233  The final “limit” that the ILC set to the 
use of necessity defence is found in Article 26 of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, which stresses that “[n]othing in this 
chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is 
 
231 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25). 
232 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art. 
25). 
233 Id. at 80, 83 (Draft Art. 25(2)(a), cmt. 20).  The maxim has been ascribed to 
a long-standing legal tradition in the English common law, dating back to the 
monk Gratian’s Decretals of 1140.  See also Sarah F. Hill, The ‘Necessity Defense’ and 
the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in its Application to the US-Argentina Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 547, 550–57 (2007) (examining the 
history and application of the necessity defense).  The necessity norm’s 
application to domestic legal orders (especially criminal law) has also been 
attributed to 17th century Western legal philosophers such as Pufendorf and 
Antonius Matthäus, see Khalid Ghanayim, Excused Necessity in Western Legal 
Philosophy, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 31, 35–39 (2006). 
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not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory 
norm of general international law.”234 
In contrast, however, no such similar conditions can be found 
in the one-sentence terminology of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  This implies that the conditions for a treaty party’s 
application of Article XI are already substantively contained in the 
limited classes defined as “necessary” measures (e.g., 
“maintenance of public order”, “fulfilment of obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security”, or the “protection of essential security interests”), and 
are thus apparently triggered ipso facto when the State invokes 
Article XI.  Where a State’s act or measure can be subsumed under 
any of these categories, all that Article XI indicates is that the State 
is “not precluded” by the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
Clearly, there is a gulf between a State’s restricted ability to 
apply Article 25 to its measure, as opposed to the seemingly more 
open capacity of a State to apply Article XI.  This difference will 
likewise bear upon the effects of, and remedies available, under 
each norm. 
2.3. Effects and Remedial Consequences 
As previously discussed in Section 1, Article 25 characterizes 
necessity as a “ground for precluding wrongfulness.” The ILC 
clarifies that State acts or measures justified under this ground 
belong to “those exceptional cases where the only way a State can 
safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent 
peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other international 
obligation of lesser weight or urgency.”235  In this sense, Article 25 
only has a suspensive effect, and one dependent on the relative 
weight of the underlying interest served by the State’s act or 
measure, in relation to other international obligations which a State 
has the duty to perform.  This view is consistent with Article 27 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which explicitly states: 
 
234 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art. 
26).  For the theory that peremptory norms can also have an ‘excusing’ effect 
when the essential interest of the State involves the protection of peremptory 
norms, see Jorge E. Viñuales, State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms in 
International Investment Law, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 79 (2008). 
235 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art. 
25, cmt. 1) (emphasis added). 
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The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to: 
(a) Compliance with the obligation in question, if and 
to the extent that the circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness no longer exists; 
(b) The question of compensation for any material loss 
caused by the act in question.236 
The ILC describes Article 27 as a “without prejudice” clause, 
where the circumstance precluding wrongfulness “do[es] not as 
such affect the underlying obligation, so that if the circumstance no 
longer exists the obligation regains full force and effect.”237  It also 
provides for compensation for material loss, so long as “the effect 
of the facts which disclose a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
[does not] also give rise to the termination of the [underlying] 
obligation.”  Material loss has been described as a “narrower” 
concept than damage, one that “concerns only the adjustment of 
losses that may occur when a party relies on a circumstance 
covered by chapter V.”238 
 
236 Id. at 85 (Draft Art. 27). 
237 Id. at 86 (Draft Art. 27, cmt 1).  But see Chusei Yamada, Revisiting the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 
117, 123 (Mauricio Ragazzi ed., 2005). 
Draft Article 27 is a “without prejudice” clause and does not give any 
answer to the question of compensation.  What is the circumstance that 
would preclude wrongfulness of a conduct but would not relieve a State 
from its responsibility to compensate for the material loss caused by its 
conduct?  Self-defence would preclude responsibility.  Necessity might 
not. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
238 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 86 (Draft Art. 
27, cmt. 4).  See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, PART I 199 (1983). 
Compensation [is] used to describe reparation in the narrow sense of the 
payment of money as a “valuation” of the wrong done.  Confusion arises 
in the case where compensation is paid for a breach of duty which is 
actionable without proof of particular items of financial loss, for example 
the violation of diplomatic or consular immunities, trespass in the 
territorial sea, or illegal arrest of a vessel on the high seas.  The award of 
compensation for such illegal acts is sometimes described as “moral” or 
“political” reparation, terms connected with concepts of “moral” and 
“political’ injury . . . . 
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More importantly, the ILC has expressly declared that the plea 
of necessity under Article 25 is “not intended to cover conduct 
which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations,” 
specifically such rules on the use of force and military necessity.  
Where a State’s conduct is covered by primary obligations, 
considerations similar to those underlying Article 25 may be 
“taken into account in the context of the formulation and 
interpretation of the primary obligations.”239  Thus, in both the 
body of its commentary to Article 27 as well as its citation of 
authorities (footnotes 406 to 409), the ILC explicitly limited the 
consideration of Article 25 to primary obligations on the use of 
force and military necessity. 
The burden to prove the applicability of necessity as a ground 
precluding wrongfulness thus falls on the State making the 
invocation in order to justify an act or measure that patently 
breaches other international obligations.240  In any case, the effect of 
applying Article 25 is simply to suspend the effectivity of other 
international obligations in relation to the questioned act or 
measure.  When the facts giving rise to the circumstance of 
necessity have ceased to exist, the State has the duty to resume 
compliance with such other obligations.  At any rate, the State is 
liable to compensate material losses suffered by any other State 
due to the former’s non-compliance. 
On the other hand, the one-sentence phraseology of Article XI 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not contain any definitive text on 
the effects of applying Article XI.  Other than the clause “[t]his 
Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary . . . ,” Article XI does not specify any consequential effect 
to “necessary measures” implemented by a treaty party under this 
provision.  As discussed in Section 1, it was erroneous (and 
nowhere borne in the language of Article XI) for the Continental 
Tribunal to impute an overriding effect of non-applicability of any 
of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT when 
Article XI operates in relation to a State’s act or measure.  Had the 
treaty parties intended this effect, there would have been language 
reflecting such intent in the text of Article XI itself, or Item No. 6 of 
the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT which clarified the meaning 
 
Id. 
239 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art. 
25, cmt. 20). 
240 See id. at 86 (Draft Art. 27, cmt. 2). 
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to “obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security” under Article XI.241  None of the cases 
interpreting Article XI (Sempra, the LG&E cases, the CMS Gas cases, 
and Continental) cite any authority or travaux preparatoires to the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT supporting the position that Article XI meant 
non-applicability of any of the U.S.-Argentina BIT’s substantive 
obligations, or that “no breach” of a BIT obligation would ever 
arise when Article XI was invoked. 
Moreover, Article X(b) and X(c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
categorically declares that the “Treaty shall not derogate from . . . (b) 
international legal obligations; or (c) obligations assumed by either 
Party . . . “242  A harmonious interpretation of these provisions in 
relation to Article XI should militate against reading Article XI as a 
blanket ‘exception’ or ‘opt-out’ clause to international legal 
obligations contained in the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  This is consistent 
with the presumed binding force of the U.S.-Argentina BIT on both 
treaty parties, and their respective duties to perform obligations 
contained therein under the general principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.243  Derogations for which a party can exclude certain 
provisions of a treaty from application for a particular period are 
expressly specified in the language of the treaty itself, and are not 
to be easily inferred.244 
Nor can Article XI be read as authority for suspension of the 
operation of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Article 57 of the VCLT 
provides that operation of a treaty may be suspended with respect 
to a particular party in two circumstances: (1) “in conformity with 
the provisions of the treaty”; or (2) “at any time by consent of all 
the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.”245  
In either case, the party invoking suspension of the treaty’s 
operation has the express duty to “notify other parties of its claim” 
 
241 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
242 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. X. 
243 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith.”). 
244 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(3), Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring States Parties to immediately report 
derogations); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (derogations limited to “to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under  international law”). 
245 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art 57. 
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under the procedures set forth in Article 65 of the VCLT.246  The 
language of Article XI belies any attempt to construe this provision 
as authority for suspension of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  It lacks any 
language indicating suspension of the operation of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, and does not provide for a duty to notify the other 
treaty party of such suspension. 
Finally, Article XI cannot be read as a reservation to the 
substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Article 2(1)(d) of 
the VCLT defines a reservation as “a unilateral statement, however 
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports 
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that State.”247  As discussed in Section 
1, both the United States and Argentina made their respective 
specific reservations to substantive obligations of the treaty in the 
Protocol, but did not make any comparable reservations with 
respect to “necessary” measures referred to under Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.  More importantly, extrapolating Article XI as 
some form of treaty “reservation” would not meet the test of 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.248  
Permitting the wholesale and indefinite exclusion of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT from applicability with respect to the classes of 
“necessary” measures in Article XI would certainly defeat the 
treaty’s stated purpose of “maintain[ing] a stable framework for 
investment and maximum effective use of economic resources.”249 
Since the language of Article XI cannot be read as a suspension 
of, or derogation from, the applicability of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 
nor as a reservation to the latter’s substantive obligations, the law 
of treaties does not support the Continental Tribunal’s 
interpretation that Article XI prevents the U.S.-Argentina BIT’s 
substantive obligations from ever applying to the classes of State 
measures indicated in Article XI.  Extending the argument further, 
 
246 Id. art. 65. 
247 Id. art. 2(1)(d). 
248 See AUST, supra note 6, at 136–38; Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 307, 316–17 (2006) (discussing “permissibility” and “opposability” 
approaches to state reservations to treaties). 
249 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl.  On the trend towards more 
concrete intent expressed through bilateral treaties, see Gabriella Blum, 
Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 323 (2008) (analyzing preference for bilateral treaties as perceived method of 
protecting sovereignty). 
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it is thus also unwarranted under the law of treaties for the 
Continental Tribunal to conclude that where Article XI applies, no 
breach of a substantive obligation under the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
could ever arise, and consequently, no duty to compensate would 
be implicated in the first instance. 
2.4. Article 25’s Disqualification from Article XI’s Range of 
Interpretive Sources within Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
If the treaty applier cannot read into Article XI any authority to 
indefinitely suspend, unilaterally modify, impliedly reserve, or 
derogate from substantive obligations under the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, what is the legal effect of Article XI?  In view of the 
interpretive rules under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and the 
primary mandate to interpret treaties “in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty,”250 the interpretation of Article XI must be contextually-
calibrated with other obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT to 
give the fullest possible effect to all of its provisions.  It has not 
been shown in any of the ICSID cases interpreting Article XI that 
the United States and Argentina intended a “special meaning” to 
the clause, “[t]his Treaty shall not preclude . . .,” as to render the 
latter the functional equivalent of non-applicability of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT (“[t]his Treaty shall not apply when . . .”) as the 
Continental Tribunal erroneously concluded.  The ordinary 
meaning of Article XI, coupled with the mandate to give full force 
and effect to the entirety of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and interpret 
the same in good faith, requires the treaty applier to harmonize 
provisions, rather than loosely imputing or assigning textually-
absent legal effects to Article XI such as suspension, modification, 
reservation, or derogation from substantive obligations under the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.251 
Considering the text of Article XI alongside the structural 
design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, it is proposed that the States 
Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT could only invoke Article XI 
against each other for state responsibility claims deriving from a 
breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, not to reject the host State’s lex 
 
250 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 31-32. 
251 See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 
(1966), reprinted in [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 220, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 (discussing general principles of treaty interpretation). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
908 U. Pa. J. Int’l. L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
specialis duties spelled out in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as specifically 
owed to foreign investors.  This differentiated approach adheres to 
the classical dichotomy between the “law of the instrument” 
(norms and consequences set forth in the treaty terms, to which the 
VCLT applies) and the “law of obligation” (obligations created 
under the treaty terms as between the state arties, as distinguished 
from obligations created under the treaty terms as between the 
host state and the investor from the counterpart state party in the 
BIT, to which the Articles on State Responsibility and other 
applicable norms of general international law apply).252  Thus, 
when a host State commits a “measure necessary for . . . the 
Protection of its own essential security interests” under Article XI 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, it remains liable to observe specific 
substantive duties to investors (e.g. the duty to pay compensation 
in the event of direct or indirect expropriations defined under 
Article IV).  However, the host State can invoke Article XI as a 
defense against the counterpart State Party’s claim of state 
responsibility due to any “internationally wrongful acts” that 
separately arise in the process of breaching BIT obligations.253 
Given the foregoing differentiation, a State party is not 
precluded by the U.S.-Argentina BIT from implementing 
“necessary measures” as defined under Article XI.  However, for 
purposes of defending its international responsibility to the other 
State Party in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the extent and duration by 
which the host State’s measures infringe substantive obligations 
would be balanced, on a case-to-case basis, in determining the 
qualitative content of compliance that could be reasonably 
expected from the host State applying the “necessary measures” in 
 
252 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 3–8 (1985) (developing “law of 
the instrument” and “law of obligation” framework). 
253 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 55 (Draft Art. 
12, cmt. 3–4). 
It is unnecessary to spell out these possibilities in article 12, since the 
responsibility of a State is engaged by the breach of an international 
obligation whatever the particular origin of the obligation concerned . . .  
Obligations may arise for a State by a treaty and by a rule of customary 
international law or by a treaty and a unilateral act.  Moreover, these 
various grounds of obligation interact with each other, as practice clearly 
shows.  Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, can contribute to the 
formation of general international law; customary law may assist in the 
interpretation of treaties; an obligation contained in a treaty may be 
applicable to a State by reason of its unilateral act, and so on.   
Id. 
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opposition to such substantive obligations under the 
circumstances.  In no case, however, would the measure’s apparent 
infringement or breach of a substantive obligation eliminate lex 
specialis duties to investors protected by the BIT, such as the duty 
to pay compensation and to comply with BIT obligations.  When a 
host State implements an NPM under Article XI, it effectively 
pleads an adjustment of expectations with respect to the 
international obligations owed to the other State Party in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  It cannot, however, cause exculpation from specific 
liability for compensation owed to the foreign investor.  This 
interpretation appears more consonant with the precise wording of 
Article XI. 
This primarily-textualist approach to interpreting the U.S.-
Argentina BIT accords with the unitary system of interpretation 
under Article 31 of the VCLT.  The formative history of the VCLT 
shows that VLCT drafters expressly rejected a proposal (advanced 
by U.S. Chief Delegate Myres McDougal) that would vest treaty 
interpreters with more discretion to weigh treaty text versus other 
extrinsic sources.254  As the International Court of Justice 
previously declared, “the first duty of a tribunal which is called 
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to 
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context of which they occur.”255  The International 
Law Commission’s 1966 Draft Commentaries to the VCLT also 
supports the view that text is the fundamental referent of the treaty 
applier, before context and other phenomena that must be taken 
together with context.256 
 
254 Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26–May 24, 1968, 
Official Records, First Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna 
Conference 1]; Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, Apr. 9–May 22, 
1969, Official Records, Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.1 (1970). 
255 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3). 
256 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, at 220 (emphasis 
added). 
Once it is established—and on this point the Commission was 
unanimous—that the starting point of interpretation is the meaning of 
the text, logic indicates that ‘the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’ should be the first element to be mentioned. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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To what extent, therefore, could the Article 25 “necessity” 
defense be relevant to the interpretation of Article XI?  As stated in 
Section 1, Article 25 is already textually different from the specific 
formulation of Article XI.  The preceding subsections in Section 2. 
have also shown that there are conceptual-methodological 
incongruities and incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article 
XI.  Article 25 must therefore be ruled out from interpretive 
consideration given the unitary system of interpretation in Article 
31 of the VCLT.  The “necessity” defense under Article 25 cannot 
be admitted within the text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Nor can it 
form part of the context of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, since Article 25 
of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility is not an “agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made by one or more of the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.”257  Nor is Article 
25 an “instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.”258  For obvious 
reasons, the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility cannot be 
treated as a “subsequent agreement” by the United States and 
Argentina regarding the interpretation or application of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.259 
At best, Article 25 can only be accepted as an interpretive tool 
under Article 31 of the VCLT as a “relevant rule of international 
law.”  Given the previously-discussed incongruities between 
Article 25 and Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, the 
precise ‘relevance’ of Article 25 to interpreting Article XI is highly 
doubtful.  Admitting Article 25 as a “relevant rule of international 
law” for interpreting Article XI, notwithstanding the conceptual-
methodological incongruities between these norms, still would not 
bolster the Continental Tribunal’s interpretive conclusions on the 
legal consequences of Article XI.  If anything, admitting Article 25 
as a “relevant rule of international law” would have the opposite 
effect.  Article 25 is textually and historically a more exacting and 
stringent normative standard than Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  And yet, Article 27 (in relation to Article 25) of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility still recognizes that the State 
 
257 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31(a). 
258 Id. art. 31(2)(b). 
259 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United State Relating to 
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 887 (2001) (discussing U.S. position on 
subsequent agreements in international trade litigation). 
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invoking the circumstance precluding wrongfulness has the duty 
of compliance upon cessation of the facts giving rise to the 
circumstance, as well as the duty to pay compensation for material 
losses suffered by other States.  If the stricter standard (Article 25) 
already imposes these duties upon the State invoking such 
standard, it is not unlikely that similar concomitant duties can 
likewise be imposed in relation to a less rigorously-formulated 
standard (Article XI).  Under this syllogism, the Continental 
Tribunal’s conclusion that there is no duty to compensate when 
Article XI applies should fail. 
Before Article 25 can be taken as a “relevant rule of 
international law” to interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, however, Article 31(3) of the VCLT requires that this rule be 
“taken together with the context.”260  This implies that there should 
be a separate showing of a linkage or nexus between Article 25 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the context of the 
treaty (composed of the text of the treaty, agreements made by the 
parties in connection with its conclusion, or instruments made by 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty) in 
determining the relevance of a rule of international law as part of 
the unitary system of interpretation under Article 31 of the 
VCLT.261  As previously discussed, no such linkage or nexus can be 
seen from the text of Article XI, the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, or the drafting history of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Considering 
that the text of Article XI appears silent on any supposed intent of 
the parties to consider Article 25, and the earlier-demonstrated 
conceptual-methodological incompatibilities between Article 25 
and Article XI, it is plausible to conclude that Article 25 does not 
constitute a “relevant rule of international law” under Article 31(3) 
of the VCLT, for purposes of interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. 
Short of a clearly expressed intent of the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT to include Article 25 within the range of interpretive 
sources collectively regarded by the treaty applier in the unitary 
system of interpretation of Article 31 of the VCLT, can Article 25 
nevertheless serve as a “supplementary means of interpretation” 
under Article 32 of the VCLT?  To recall, despite the Continental 
Tribunal’s insistence that it regarded Article XI disjunctively from 
 
260 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31(3). 
261 IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 118, 130–
38 (2d ed. 1984). 
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Article 25, the Tribunal’s flow of reasoning in the Continental 
Award still evinced a pattern of treating Article 25 as a 
supplementary means of interpreting Article XI.262 
The supplementary reference to Article 25 in interpreting 
Article XI, however, should still abide by the rules for 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the 
VCLT.  It was not shown in the Continental Award that the 
requisites of Article 32 of the VCLT had been met.  In the first 
place, Article 25 cannot be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation because it cannot “confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of Article 31 [of the VCLT].”  The conceptual-
methodological incongruities between Article 25 and Article XI 
negate Article 25’s capacity to confirm meaning resulting from the 
application of text, context, and other phenomena (such as 
subsequent practice or agreement, and relevant rules of 
international law) relating to Article XI. 
Second, Article 25 cannot be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation under Article 32 in the determinative sense, since it 
has not been shown that an interpretation of Article XI under the 
unitary system of Article 31 of the VCLT (text, context, other 
phenomena) “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure,” or 
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”263  
In fact, the stark flaw in the Continental Award stems from the 
Tribunal’s imputation of legal consequences (e.g. suspension or 
modification of, or derogation from, substantive obligations of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT) that were not found in the text of Article XI or 
elsewhere in the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  The Continental Tribunal did 
not show that the systematic consideration of Article XI’s text, 
context, subsequent agreement or practice of the United States and 
Argentina, or relevant rules of international law, resulted in 
ambiguity, obscurity, or manifestly absurd or unreasonable results.  
As the treaty applier making use of Article 25 as a supplementary 
means of interpretation, the Continental Tribunal failed to meet the 
threshold requirements of Article 32 of the VCLT. 
The “necessity” defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles of 
State Responsibility does not furnish a useful interpretive tool for 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Article 25 bears no textual 
linkage to Article XI, and there is no evidence that the parties to the 
 
262 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 paras. 175, 190–
91 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
263 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32. 
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U.S.-Argentina BIT and its Protocol ever intended for the language 
of Article XI to reflect the customary international law necessity 
defense.  In this sense, while it has been argued that Article 31(3) of 
the VCLT gives room for a narrow proposition that the evolution 
and development of law can be taken into account in interpreting a 
treaty, it must first be shown that the “very nature [of the terms of 
the treaty are] expressed in such general terms as to lend 
themselves to an evolutionary approach.”264  There is no such 
showing in Article XI. 
Nor has it been shown that the “necessity” defense under 
customary international law was operationalized in other 
contextual phenomena such as agreements or instruments relating 
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Finally, it has not been shown among 
the travaux preparatoires to the U.S.-Argentina BIT that the parties 
even contemplated the “necessity” defense under customary 
international law when they formulated the precise phraseology of 
Article XI.  Clearly, the varying degrees of conflation of Article 25 
and Article XI across the ICSID awards in Sempra, LG & E, CMS 
Gas, and most recently, Continental, are superfluous to the process 
of decision-making.  Article 25 unduly complicates, and does not 
illuminate, the discursive formulation of Article XI. 
3. ARTICLE XI (LEX SPECIALIS) AS THE EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF LAW, 
UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY TEXT 
The Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental cases illustrate a 
threshold problem for the treaty applier: sin determining meaning 
under Article XI, to what extent is it acceptable to refer to sources 
external to the treaty text?  And if referring to external sources, 
what internal criteria makes these particular sources controlling for 
the treaty applier?  Sempra represents one end of the spectrum of 
choices, where the Tribunal as treaty applier completely relied on 
Article 25 as the controlling external source to interpret Article 
XI.265  The LG&E Tribunal referred to Article 25 only to support its 
a priori analysis of Article XI’s meaning.266  The Tribunal in the 
CMS Gas Tribunal did not accept all elements of Article 25, but 
instead, only imported one element of the concept of “necessity” 
 
264 TASLIM O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 140 (1974). 
265 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 
375–76 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
266 LG&E Energy Corporation v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, para. 245 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
914 U. Pa. J. Int’l. L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
under Article 25 to characterize the supposed structural design of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and ultimately to draw a broad 
interpretation of Article XI that includes the concept of economic 
emergencies.267  The other end of the spectrum (where the treaty 
applier chose not to rely on Article 25 as a controlling external 
source to interpret Article XI) could be seen from the Ad Hoc 
Committee’s Decision on Application for Annulment in CMS Gas.  
In CMS Gas, however, while the Ad Hoc Committee noted 
conceptual distinctions between Article 25 and Article XI as to 
substantive content, operation, and effects, the Committee was also 
the first to make the problematic interpretation—without citing 
any legal authorities—that the U.S.-Argentina BIT’s substantive 
obligations could not apply alongside Article XI if the latter is 
properly invoked.  Simply put, for the Ad Hoc Committee, the 
applicability of Article XI removes the questioned act or measure 
of a State from the scope of substantive obligations throughout the 
rest of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.268 
Under its more controversial methodology, the Continental 
Award treads both ends of the spectrum of choices available to the 
treaty applier.  While the Continental Tribunal acknowledged the 
conceptual distinctions between Article 25 and Article XI explained 
by the Ad Hoc Committee in CMS Gas, the Tribunal nevertheless 
latently referred to Article 25 in a “supplementary” sense to 
support its choice of a broad definition of “essential security 
interests” in Article XI.269  The Continental Tribunal then adopted a 
Sempra-like approach by completely relying on external sources 
from different legal regimes, as when it introduced WTO and 
GATT law as ‘controlling’ legal authorities for infusing substantive 
meaning to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.270 
As Section 1’s critical survey has shown, the tribunals as treaty 
appliers in the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases faced 
the threshold question on the use of external sources without 
explaining how their respective methodologies could be justified 
under the system of unitary interpretation in Article 31 of the 
 
267 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, paras. 357–60 (May 11, 2005). 
268 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 129–136 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
269 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, paras. 
164, 175, 180, 190–91 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
270 Id. para. 192. 
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VCLT, or the rules on supplementary means of interpretation 
under Article 32 of the VCLT.  All of the Tribunals in these cases 
made choices on the extent to which they would rely on an 
external source (Article 25), based on another legal regime 
(customary law as codified by the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility), without an adequate explanation for these choices 
in the reasoning of each respective Award.  Instead, what appears 
implicit from the manner by which the Tribunals disposed of their 
methodological choices is that the “necessity” defense under 
Article 25 was already assumed to have some form of relationship 
or nexus to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  All of the Awards 
interpreting Article XI to date have carried this assumption in 
varying degrees, without sufficiently explaining why. 
Clearly, there is a need to return to fundamental dynamics 
under the law of treaties.  To avoid the criticism that treaty 
appliers’ problematic choices of law (and their accompanying 
interpretive methodologies) thwart the stability of decisionmaking 
and the rule of law in the international legal order,271 it is 
imperative that future tribunals interpreting Article XI (or other 
similarly-worded BIT clauses) make a clear preliminary statement 
of their choice of law that explains the tribunal’s internal criteria on 
how it employs external sources to derive treaty meanings.  Unless 
there is clear textual support in the treaty language that 
incorporates the customary doctrine of “necessity” under Article 
25, the choice of law should exclusively be the treaty provision 
stipulating non-precluded measures (e.g., Article XI in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT) in relation to the elements of the unitary system of 
interpretation found in Article 31 of the VCLT.  Regarding the 
specific case of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, the 
inevitable choice of law should purely be Article XI.  Based on 
Section 2’s discussion of conceptual-methodological 
incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI, Sections 1 and 
2 have shown that Article XI’s textual formulation does not show 
that the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT intended to incorporate 
the customary doctrine of “necessity.”  However, the text of other 
BIT clauses on similar non-precluded measures could foreseeably 
provide this nexus.  For these cases, treaty appliers must therefore 
 
271 A recent empirical survey of ICSID decisions observes that ICSID 
tribunals make interpretive arguments in a manner “that is quite far removed 
from the structures set out in Articles 31–32 of the VCLT.”  Fauchald, supra note 
12, at 358–59. 
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make methodological choices within the framework of Articles 31 
and 32 of VCLT, and refer to the customary doctrine of “necessity” 
only when the treaty text indicates the parties’ intent to incorporate 
this customary norm. 
The following two subsections of this Article show that the 
normative choices involving Article 25 and Article XI inherently 
constitute a basic conflict of norms for the treaty applier. As a 
corollary to this basic conflicts, the manner in which treaty appliers 
resolve this conflict will frame their view of the duties of a host 
State invoking Article XI both at the time of investment as well as 
subsequent to the implementation of the act or measure under 
Article XI, the quantum of evidence they will require from a host 
State to prove Article XI’s applicability to the host State’s act or 
measure, and to what degree the host State has a margin of 
appreciation in determining “essential security interests” under 
Article XI, and the extent to which the host State’s act or measure 
appears “reasonable” or “proportional” in relation to adjusting 
compensation claims brought under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
Section 3.1 looks to the treaty applier’s theoretical considerations in 
resolving the conflict of norms, while Section 3.2 applies the 
theoretical considerations to tentatively propose functional 
guideposts to interpreting Article XI (and other similarly-worded 
treaty clauses) in the future.  By returning to the fundamental 
interpretive rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, the author 
hopes that future decision-making on Article XI-type clauses will 
become more methodologically-transparent and outcome-
predictive. 
3.1. Article XI as Lex Specialis vis-a-vis Article 25 
At first glance, the treaty applier’s interpretive choices on 
Article XI and Article 25 do not appear to represent a real 
normative conflict.  The traditional formulation of a conflict is 
captured by Wilfred Jenks’ classical 1953 treatise: “A conflict in the 
strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to a 
treaty cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under 
both treaties.”272 
The foregoing definition implies that “the norms are mutually 
exclusive; they cannot coexist in a legal order.  Compliance with 
 
272 Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 
426 (1953). 
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one norm entails non-compliance with the other.”273  Under this 
formulation, there does not appear to be a direct conflict between 
Article XI and Article 25.  A State’s ipso facto implementation of an 
act or measure encompassed by the classes of “necessary” 
measures under Article XI will not, on its face, breach Article 25.  
Rather, as discussed in Section 2, the conceptual-methodological 
incompatibilities between Article XI and Article 25 make the case 
for separating one norm from the other.  The applicability of 
Article XI can thus be conceptually divided from the issue of 
compliance with Article 25.  A further point that favors conceptual 
separation is the language of Article XI (“This Treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary . . .”), which appears permissive, rather than prohibitory, 
of certain types of State actions or measures.  It does not appear 
that conduct permitted under Article XI is conversely prohibited 
under Article 25.274 
However, as the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases 
have shown there is an interpretive conflict between an exclusive 
consideration of Article XI within the confines of conventional law 
and a blended interpretation of Article XI involving the customary 
doctrine of “necessity” in Article 25.  In its 2006 report, the 
International Law Commission’s Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law defined a “relationship of 
interpretation” as the case “where one norm assists in the 
interpretation of another.  A norm may assist in the interpretation 
of another norm for example as an application, clarification, 
updating, or modification of the latter.  In such a situation, both 
norms are applied in conjunction.”275  Considering the conceptual-
methodological incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI 
discussed in Section 2, it cannot be said that the customary doctrine 
of “necessity” codified under Article 25 could bear such a 
 
273 SEYED ALI SADAT AKHAVI, METHODS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
TREATIES 5 (2003). 
274 See Erich Vranes, The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and 
Legal Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 395, 404–05 (2006) (questioning narrow definition of 
normative conflicts). 
275 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/10, reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Intl’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/61/10,  
available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft 
%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf [hereinafter ILC, Conclusions]. 
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“relationship of interpretation” to Article XI, more so where the 
text and drafting history of Article XI do not show that the parties 
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT intended such a relationship.  As such, 
what subsists for the treaty applier in considering Article XI vis-à-
vis Article 25 is a “relationship of conflict,” defined by the ILC as 
the case “where two norms that are both valid and applicable point 
to incompatible decisions so that a choice must be made between 
them.  The basic rules concerning the resolution of normative 
conflicts are to be found in the VCLT.”276  The ILC stresses the 
importance of following the framework of treaty interpretation 
under Articles 31–33 of the VCLT, and states that harmonization is 
a “generally accepted principle” where, “when several norms bear 
on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted 
so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”277 
The interpretive issue for the treaty applier in regard to Article 
XI, therefore, is one of priority between the lex specialis standard 
(Article XI) and a customary norm (the defense of “necessity” 
codified under Article 25).  Under the maxim lex specialis derogat 
legi generali, priority among norms dealing with the same subject 
matter should be given to the norm that is more specific, even 
where the norms involve treaty and non-treaty standards (such as 
custom, in this case).278  According to the ILC, the rationale for this 
principle is that the special law, “being more concrete, often takes 
better account of the particular features of the context in which it is 
to be applied than any applicable general law.  Its application may 
also often create a more equitable result and it may often better 
reflect the intent of the legal subjects.”279 
The same may be said of Article XI.  Treaty appliers of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT are better advised to first examine the entire text 
and structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the obligations 
contained therein when they endeavor to derive the meaning and 
legal consequences to Article XI, instead of immediately reaching 
for external sources (such as the doctrine of “necessity” codified 
under Article 25, or, in the Continental Award, GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence relating to Article XX of GATT 1947) that do not 
appear to have been foremost (if ever) in the consideration of the 
 
276 Id. § 1(2). 
277 Id. § 1(4). 
278 AKHAVI, supra note 273, at 101–03. 
279 ILC, Conclusions, supra note 275, § 2(7). 
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treaty drafters.  Straining to infuse substantive content to Article 
XI, when the treaty drafting history or travaux preparatoires do not 
indicate consideration of the customary doctrine of “necessity” in 
the first place, is a precipitate exercise that creates the appearance 
of arbitrariness in international decision-making.  Regrettably, the 
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, or Continental awards did not pay 
thorough attention to the full text and structural design of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT in interpreting Article XI.  While it is certainly 
arguable that the majority of these decisions reached the correct 
result (more on factual grounds), treaty appliers’ interpretive 
methodologies should not be masked in obscurity. 
It is also important to consider that the entirety of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT constitutes a “special regime” that is itself lex 
specialis.  The ILC defines a “special regime” as a “group of rules 
and principles concerned with a particular subject matter [that] 
often have their own institutions to administer the relevant 
rules”280 and usually fall under one of three types:  (1) one where 
“a violation of a particular group of (primary) rules is accompanied 
by a special set of (secondary) rules concerning breach and 
reactions to breach”; (2) one formed by “a set of special rules, 
including rights and obligations, relating to a special subject 
matter”; or (3) one where “all the rules and principles that regulate 
a certain problem area are collected together.”281  The U.S.-
Argentina BIT fits within the first two types of special regimes.  It 
is specifically intended by the parties to promote greater economic 
cooperation and investment between them, based on fair and 
equitable treatment and under a stable legal framework that 
encourages reciprocal protection of investment.282  It contains 
special rules governing rights and obligations of the host State and 
investors from the treaty parties in relation to their respective 
investments.  More importantly, it provides various anticipatory 
and remedial mechanisms for breach of substantive obligations: (1) 
reservation of the right to deny advantages of the treaty in third-
party control situations;283 (2) the right to make exceptions to 
national treatment, subject to duties of notification;284 (3) dispute 
resolution mechanisms, along with the duty to promptly consult 
 
280 Id. § 2(11). 
281 Id § 2(12). 
282 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl. 
283 Id. art. I(2) (relating to art. II(9). 
284 Id. art. II(1) (relating to the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT). 
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and discuss matters relating to interpretation or application of the 
treaty;285 (4) in case of direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization, the duty to pay prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation (specifically defined as the “fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory 
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier . . . 
includ[ing] interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date 
of expropriation”;286 (5) for nationals or companies of either party 
whose investment has been partly or wholly expropriated, the 
right to prompt review by appropriate judicial or administrative 
authorities;287 and (6) the right to terminate the treaty after written 
notice to the other party.288 
Thus, when the Continental Tribunal interpreted Article XI to 
mean that none of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT would ever apply when a State act or measure is covered by 
Article XI, the Tribunal made an interpretive choice automatically 
rejecting the entire lex specialis that is the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  As 
previously discussed in Section 1.4, the Tribunal did not cite 
authorities supporting this interpretation other than the Ad Hoc 
Committee Decision in CMS Gas (which, likewise, did not cite any 
legal authority for this position).  To reiterate, the text of Article XI 
does not favor giving this drastic effect of suspension, 
modification, or termination of obligations under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  Nowhere in the Tribunal’s reasoning in the 
Continental Award were there legal reasons furnished for the 
sweeping rejection of lex specialis substantive obligations. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, the more cogent approach to 
interpreting Article XI as the lex specialis lies mainly with the tenets 
of harmonization that the ILC has already explicated in its 2006 
Report.  Accordingly, treaty appliers should look to the ordinary 
meaning of the text of Article XI in relation to the other substantive 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  (As discussed in Section 2.4, 
suspension of substantive obligations does not appear to have 
textual support from Article XI in relation to the rest of the 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT).  They should likewise be 
mindful of the object and purpose of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which 
 
285 Id. arts. VI–VIII. 
286 Id. art. IV(1). 
287 Id. art. IV(2). 
288 Id. art. XIV(2). 
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is to provide a stable framework for investment that encourages 
reciprocal protection among parties and their respective investors.  
A textually-unsupported, blanket and indefinite exclusion of a 
State act or measure under Article XI from the substantive 
obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not advance, and 
instead defeats, this object and purpose.  To reiterate, the 
interpretation that better harmonizes Article XI within the 
overriding framework and structural design of lex specialis 
obligations in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is to treat Article XI as a 
defense pleaded by a host State, when its BIT counterpart State 
Party raises separate claims of international responsibility arising 
from the continuum of operative acts that gave rise to breaches of 
BIT obligations. 
That said, it is difficult to offer an immutable a priori 
interpretation of the one-sentence formulation of Article XI without 
considering actual factual circumstances giving rise to the legal 
standards contained in Article XI.  Determining whether a State act 
or measure is “necessary” under Article XI for being one that 
involves the “maintenance of public order,” “the fulfilment of 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security,” or the “protection of essential 
interests,” involves the treaty applier’s appreciation of the factual 
circumstances that approximate these legal standards.  Factual 
phenomena must be carefully calibrated with legal norms.289  In 
this process of normative conflict-resolution and interpretation, the 
treaty applier should openly justify his or her interpretive 
methodology within the governing dynamics of Articles 31 and 32 
of the VCLT.  This justification is clearly lacking from the decisions 
in Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental, and largely accounts 
for the conceptually-problematic transposition of meaning and 
legal effect from the customary doctrine of “necessity” under 
Article 25 to Article XI. 
It is only by treating the entirety of the U.S.-Argentina BIT as 
the governing lex specialis that the treaty applier could reach the 
“more equitable result” to rationalize interpretation.  This means 
that even with the applicability of Article XI, the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT remains in force, and the host State retains its duties both to 
 
289 See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg 
trans., MIT Press 1998) (providing a sociologically informed conceptualization of 
law and basic rights). 
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the investor and its counterpart State Party in the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  If there are breaches of substantive obligations under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT arising from the State’s act or measure under Article 
XI, it is for the treaty applier to distinguish modalities of 
responsibility to the investor and the counterpart State Party.  
Article XI can only be used by the treaty applier to adjudicate state 
responsibility, and accordingly calibrate the reasonability of the 
State’s (non)compliance with other substantive duties, such as the 
injured State’s rights under general international law to 
compensation and to exact performance of treaty obligations.  On 
the other hand, Article XI cannot be used to deny liability to an 
investor for compensation for direct or indirect expropriations 
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, or even for damages in the case of 
“unlawful expropriations.”290 
As the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental cases show, a 
State’s invocation of Article XI does not escape review under the 
same dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.291  This balancing role of adjudication, under a 
setting of methodological openness, is precisely what makes treaty 
interpretation “to some extent an art, not an exact science.”292 
3.2. Possible Guideposts for Consideration in Article XI Interpretation 
Without the facts of actual cases or controversies, it is difficult 
to definitively interpret Article XI (and similarly-worded treaty 
provisions on non-precluded measures).  As discussed in the 
previous subsection, the treaty applier assumes the task of 
calibrating Article XI alongside the rest of the provisions of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT in determining the qualitative level of 
compliance to be observed by the host State invoking Article XI, 
only as against its counterpart State Party. 
The choice of the lex specialis (Article XI) as the exclusive 
operative norm (and devoid of the infusion of substantive content 
from the customary doctrine of “necessity” under Article 25), 
 
290 Reisman, supra note 211, at 61.  See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, Final 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, paras. 480–85 (Oct. 2, 2006) (laying out the 
applicable standard for assessing damages). 
291 The fact that ICSID Tribunals chose to accept jurisdiction and exercise 
their respective competencies over the disputes in these cases only underscores 
that the U.S.-Argentina BIT was not suspended, modified, or terminated by 
Argentina’s invocation of Article XI. 
292 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, at 218. 
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however, raises several preliminary considerations for the treaty 
applier in future interpretive applications of Article XI.  At the very 
least, the treaty applier’s choice of the lex specialis should affect the 
complexion of other interrelated aspects of adjudication when a 
State undertakes an Article XI-type act or measure. 
The first aspect involves the treaty applier’s perspective on the 
duties of the host State, both at the time the investment was 
entered into, and at the time the State implements an act or 
measure under the rubric of the “necessity” defense.  As seen in 
the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental awards, Argentina 
invoked the customary defense of “necessity” in relation to Article 
XI in order to plead release from its BIT obligations to observe fair 
and equitable treatment, full protection or security of investment, 
and the most favored nation clause, as well as to pay compensation 
for acts of expropriation. 
However, Article 55 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility clearly states that the lex specialis alone controls 
“where the conditions for the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of 
international law.”293  Since the various provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT themselves contain the conditions for determining 
the existence of a breach, and subsequently, the content of the 
State’s international responsibility, the treaty applier’s 
determination of the duties of the host State should be relatively 
straightforward.  Thus, at the time that the investment is entered 
into, the host State has positive duties, among others, to: (1) 
“permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, 
on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investment or associated activities of its own nationals or 
companies” (national treatment);294 (2) “at all times accord [the 
investment] fair and equitable treatment,” where the investment 
shall “enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be 
accorded treatment less than that required by international law” 
(fair and equitable treatment);295 (3) “observe any obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investments” (umbrella clause);296 
 
293 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 140 (Draft 
art. 55). 
294 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. II(1). 
295 Id. arts. II(2)(a), XII(1). 
296 Id. art. II(2)(c). 
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(4) permit nationals of either party to “enter and remain in the 
territory of the other Party for the purpose of establishing, 
developing, administering or advising on the operation of an 
investment” (entry into territory);297 (5) permit companies making 
the investment “to engage top managerial personnel of their 
choice, regardless of nationality” (choice of management);298 and 
(6) provide an open regulatory framework that does “not impair 
the substance of any of the rights set forth in this Treaty,” with 
access to effective means of remedial redress and enforcement of 
investor rights (assertion of claims and enforcement of rights).299 
Subsequent to the entry of the investment, the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT stipulates negative duties, among others, for host States 
designed to ensure investor protection:  (1) non-impairment of the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, 
expansion, or disposal of investments through arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures (non-impairment through arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures);300 (2) prohibition against direct or 
indirect expropriation or nationalization, except for a public 
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance 
with due process of law and the general principles of treatment 
provided for in Article II(2) (expropriation);301 and (3) prohibition 
against delay or obstruction of transfers related to an investment 
(transfers).302  Finally, the U.S.-Argentina BIT expressly provides for 
resort to consultation, negotiation, and failing these procedures, 
binding arbitration, in the event that an investment dispute arises.  
Considering the totality of all of positive and negative duties of the 
host State in the lex specialis regime of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the 
treaty applier should be able to weigh the host State’s factual 
compliance with these duties alongside the “permissive” language 
of measures under Article XI.  To a lesser extent, this was 
undertaken by the ICSID Tribunals in the Sempra, LG&E, and CMS 
Gas cases, where the Tribunals commonly accorded considerable 
weight to Argentina’s specific guarantees in the Licenses to the oil 
distribution/utilities sectors to characterize Argentina’s heavier 
 
297 Id. art. II(3). 
298 Id. art. II(4). 
299 Id. arts. II(6), II(7), III. 
300 Id. art. II(2)(b). 
301 Id. art. IV(1). 
302 Id. art. V. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/4
2010] NON-PRECLUDED MEASURES IN BITs 925 
 
duties as a host State in relation to these sectors, as against 
Argentina’s permissive authority under Article XI to implement 
general emergency measures during the Argentine financial crisis.  
This can be distinguished from the facts in Continental, which did 
not contain similar industry-specific guarantees at the time the 
investment was made. 
Precisely because the body of lex specialis alone under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT controls the treaty applier’s perspective on the 
duties of the host State, the treaty applier can undertake an 
informed process of balancing qualitative compliance with such 
duties alongside the “permissive” conduct of non-precluded 
measures contemplated in Article XI.  It is only when the treaty 
applier arbitrarily infuses the customary doctrine of “necessity” 
under Article 25 (which, as previously discussed, is conceptually 
and methodologically incompatible with Article XI) to provide 
substantive content that the topography of host State duties 
becomes inconsistent and incoherent.  As shown in Part 2 the 
treaty applier’s balancing task becomes complicated with this 
needless merger of different (and clearly incompatible) normative 
legal regimes.303 
The second aspect involves the question of evidence.  When the 
treaty applier focuses on lex specialis alone (e.g. the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, since, as previously shown, the customary defense of 
“necessity” cannot be treated as an applicable rule of international 
law)304, what quantum of evidence will suffice to show that a host 
 
303 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); 
International Law Commission, supra note 215, at 140 (Draft Art. 55). 
It will depend on the special rule to establish the extent to which the 
more general rules on State responsibility set out in the present articles 
are displaced by that rule.  In some cases, it will be clear from the 
language of a treaty or other text that only the consequences specified are 
to flow.  Where that is so, the consequence will be “determined” by the 
special rule and the principle embodied in article 55 will apply.  In other 
cases, one aspect of the general law may be modified, leaving other 
aspects still applicable. . . .  
For the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same 
subject matter is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual 
inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one 
provision is to exclude the other. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
304 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 
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State’s act or measure is properly encompassed within any of the 
three classes of “necessary” measures under Article XI?  To what 
extent, if at all, will the treaty applier defer to the host State’s 
discretion in determining that a measure serves the “maintenance 
of public order,” “fulfilment of obligations with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace or security,” or “the protection 
of essential security interests”?  Again, a deeper consideration of 
lex specialis as a whole should guide the treaty applier’s evidentiary 
considerations. 
It may be recalled that in Sempra, LG & E, CMS Gas, as well as 
Continental, the ICSID Tribunals were careful to assert that they 
were not substituting their own judgment for the economic policy 
and financial judgment of the Argentine government.  However, it 
is clear that the burden of proof for proving the applicability of 
Article XI to its Capital Control Regime measures lay with 
Argentina, who had invoked this treaty provision.  This initial 
assignment of probative burden is consistent with the broad 
general rule in international tribunals that “the burden of proof 
rests upon him who asserts the affirmative of a proposition that if 
not substantiated will result in a decision adverse to his 
contention.”305 
The quantum of evidence exacted by the ICSID Tribunals in 
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases inevitably 
depended on the Tribunals’ respective qualitative appreciation of 
the legal standards306 “maintenance of public order,” “fulfilment of 
obligations with respect to the maintenance of international peace 
or security,” or “the protection of essential security interests,” 
juxtaposed with the overall design and structure of the U.S.-
 
159 (“The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. . .”) (emphasis added). 
305 DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127 
(Univ. of Virginia Press, revised ed., 1975); See MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF 
AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 369 
(1996) (explaining that the party who makes allegations regarding a disputed fact 
or issue bears the burden of proving such fact or issue). 
306 Notably, the Tribunals made varying degrees of comparative legal 
analysis, particularly in explaining the content of “public order” in relation to the 
Spanish orden publico and the French ordre publique.  This method of comparative 
law reference has been observed as a common methodological phenomenon in 
international arbitration.  See Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Comparative Law as Rhetoric: 
An Analysis of the Use of Comparative Law in International Arbitration, 8 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 1 (2007) (noting the frequent use of comparative law in arbitral 
rhetoric). 
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Argentina BIT.  In Sempra, the Tribunal restated the object and 
purpose of the U.S.-Argentina BIT before accepting economic 
emergencies as reasonably within the standard of “essential 
security interests.”307  Similar reasoning was employed by the 
Tribunal in LG&E, although it held that Argentina was liable for 
compensation “once the state of necessity was over.”308  The CMS 
Gas Tribunal followed the same broad interpretation of “essential 
security interests” and found the existence of a state of necessity, 
but held that Argentina had a duty to compensate that was 
analogous to the material loss liability provision in Article 27 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility.309  Finally, as previously discussed, 
the Continental Tribunal determined the existence of “essential 
security interests” triggering Article XI under a different (and 
lower) threshold driven by GATT and WTO jurisprudence in 
relation to Article XX of GATT 1947.310 
As has been argued throughout this Article, however, the 
qualitative appreciation of legal standards in Article XI cannot be 
divorced from a holistic consideration of the text, design, and 
structure of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  While the factual 
circumstances of the Argentine economic crisis considered by the 
ICSID Tribunals in Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental 
appear to be reasonably embraced within the concept of “essential 
security interests,” what remains in dispute is the legal effect 
attached by each of these Tribunals to “non-preclusion” under 
Article XI.  In this case, Argentina ought to have been assigned the 
heavier burden of proof to show that the legal effect of non-
preclusion was (as it indeed claimed) outright exculpation from 
liability under the rest of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.  Considering that the text of Article XI nowhere 
provided for this asserted legal effect, the Continental Tribunal (and 
likewise, the Ad Hoc Committee in CMS Gas) should have required 
evidence from Argentina, who was stating the affirmative 
proposition on Article XI’s supposed legal effect.  Otherwise, the 
 
307 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
para. 139 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
308 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability para. 265 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
309 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award, paras. 383–94 (May 12, 2005). 
310 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 
para. 192 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
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reasonable inference drawn from the text of Article XI, as well as 
the object and purpose of the parties in entering into the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, would be to ensure that the substantive obligations 
of the treaty would remain binding and in force.  Exceptions to 
substantive coverage ought not to be lightly assumed.311 
To a considerable extent, the Tribunals in Sempra, LG& E, CMS 
Gas, and Continental observed this method of allocation of the 
burden of proof for a different, but related matterascertaining 
the nature of Article XI as “self-judging” or “non-self-judging.”  
Since Argentina and the respective claimant-investors advanced 
their own affirmative views on this subject, both parties were 
called upon to present evidence to show that the parties to the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT intended that the Article would be self-judging.  
Owing to their observance of the allocative method on the burden 
of proof in this matter, it is unsurprising that the Tribunals in 
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental separately reached the 
unanimous and well-considered conclusion that Article XI is not a 
“self-judging” clause. 
The last aspect that should affect the treaty applier’s choice of 
the lex specialis is the issue of damages and/or compensation.  
Viewing the U.S.-Argentina BIT as the lex specialis should not be 
taken as inhibitive to using the general rules on state responsibility 
in a residual manner,312 particularly on the issue of damages where 
the text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is entirely silent.  (The issue of 
compensation under Article IV(1) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is 
directed towards the legality of an expropriation, and not as a 
means of reparation for breaches of the substantive obligations 
contained throughout the entire U.S.-Argentina BIT).  This is 
utterly different from the situation where Article XI already 
contains a specific normative formulation, and a treaty applier 
 
311 See Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for 
Some Standard Rules, 28 INT’L LAW. 47 (1994) (arguing that international tribunals 
are poorly equipped for the fact-finding task). 
312 See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-
contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 500–01 (2006). 
First, the rules of the special regime, ordinarily codified in a treaty 
instrument, must be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to establish whether the 
states parties intended the regime’s secondary rules to be exhaustive and 
complete.  Second, resort must be had to general international law to 
verify whether the latter permits such derogation. 
Id.  
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erroneously attempts to infuse substantive content to this 
formulation from a separate legal regime such as the customary 
doctrine of “necessity.”  As previously discussed in Section 3.1 in 
relation to Section 2, given the abject incompatibilities between 
both norms, the customary doctrine of “necessity” bears a 
“relationship of conflict” with Article XI. 
In the case of damages, however, the general rules of 
international law, specifically customary doctrines on reparation as 
codified in the Articles on State Responsibility, can be viewed as a 
“relevant rule of international law” within the interpretive 
framework of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  Awarding damages in case of treaty breaches is entirely 
consistent with the U.S.-Argentina BIT’s objects of “maintaining a 
stable framework for investment” and encouraging “reciprocal 
protection of investment.”  Considering that the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT’s dispute resolution mechanisms in Articles VI and VII 
contemplates resort to binding arbitration before the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), it is 
reasonable to conclude that parties foresaw the application of 
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention (which entitles ICSID 
Tribunals to decide a dispute in accordance with “applicable rules 
of international law.”)  The law on reparations, specifically as 
codified in Articles 31 and 34 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility, inimitably comprise part of the corpus of such 
applicable international legal rules in investment adjudication.313 
In summary, interpreting Article XI against the context of the 
entire U.S.-Argentina BIT makes the exclusive choice of the lex 
specialis inevitable.  The glaring conceptual-methodological 
incompatibilities between the customary defense of “necessity” 
under Article 25 and non-precluded measures under Article XI 
sufficiently disposes of any interpretive function of the former 
towards the latter.  Where the text of the non-precluded measures 
 
313 In the cases so far published, ICSID tribunals have framed the obligations 
imposed by their awards in pecuniary terms.  This not due to a belief that they 
lack the power to proceed otherwise.  Rather, the cases involve situations in which 
the investment relationship had broken down and the claimants had defined their 
demands in pecuniary terms.  It is entirely possible that future cases will involve 
disputes arising from ongoing relationships in which awards providing for 
specific performance or injunctions become relevant.  Tribunals imposing such 
non-pecuniary obligations should provide for a pecuniary alternative in case of 
non-performance such as liquidated damages, penalties, or another obligation to 
pay a certain sum of money.  CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 1124–26 (2001). 
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clause in a treaty specifically provides for resort to such other types 
of normative regimes under international law, however, such 
norms could be admitted to establish a “relationship of 
interpretation” between the treaty standard and the non-treaty 
standard.  This is perfectly consistent with the framework of the 
unitary system of interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT and 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the 
VCLT. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Financial downturns, economic recessions, and other economic 
emergencies have been “associated with the peaks of business 
cycles,”314 the trends of which appear almost as historically 
inevitable as death and taxes.315  Even as of this writing, the 2008 
global financial crisis has yet to fully unravel, and governments 
throughout the world are besieged by calls for recovery and 
reform.316  Under a persistent climate of high risk, market 
uncertainty, and capital volatility, it is not unlikely that more 
governments will find inspiration from Argentina’s triumphant 
use of the defense of necessity or economic emergency in the 
Continental Award to defeat investor claims.  At the very least, the 
Continental Tribunal’s interpretation of non-precluded measures 
under Article XI could spur similar assertions with respect to other 
bilateral investment treaties throughout the world that contain 
clauses akin to Article XI.  Independent of the interpretation of 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the quandary about the 
interpretation of treaty clauses involving non-precluded measures 
is far from over. 
 
314 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES 3 (4th ed. 2000). 
315 See JEAN TIROLE, FINANCIAL CRISES, LIQUIDITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM (2002) (focusing on market failure, crisis prevention, and 
institutional design); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002) (discussing how globalization has influenced economic development); THE 
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA (Wing Thye Woo, Jeffrey D. 
Sachs, & Klaus Schwab eds. 2000) (analyzing the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-
1999). 
316 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008).  See Global Economy 
in ‘Major Downturn’ from Financial Crisis: IMF, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 8, 
2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gaPha4zcGA1e5SzeYw 
ZW6EWKBMDQ (reporting that the global economy is in a major downturn while 
entering 2009 after a shock in financial markets). 
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There is an urgent need to address the lack of transparency and 
coherence in treaty appliers’ interpretive methodologies.  As this 
Article shows, the recurring problem of how to interpret Article XI 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT exposes divergences in methodologies 
even among the various ICSID Tribunals in Sempra, LG&E, CMS 
Gas, and most recently, Continental.  Deficiencies in Continental, the 
most recent of these Awards, do little to inspire confidence in the 
stability of the international legal investment regime.  When treaty 
appliers appear to enjoy almost unfettered discretion in cherry-
picking extrinsic sources from which to cull the supposed 
substantive content and legal effects of a bilateral treaty provision, 
without showing the justifications for its interpretive methodology 
within the canonical rules of interpretation in the law of treaties, 
there are obvious red flags to the practice and development of 
international investment law. 
The logical response to stem this groundswell of instability lies 
with restoring fealty to interpretive rules under Articles 31 and 32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  This Article re-
examined the infusion of the customary defense of “necessity” into 
the interpretation of Article XI against the components of the 
unitary system of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT, and 
showed that neither text, context, subsequent agreement or 
practice of the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT support the use of 
the customary norm as an interpretive tool.  Conceptual and 
methodological incompatibilities between the customary defense 
of “necessity” (as codified under Article 25 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility) and Article XI also militate against the treaty 
applier’s reference to Article 25 as a “relevant rule of international 
law” under Article 31(3) of the VCLT.  Neither can the customary 
defense of “necessity” be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation within the framework of Article 32 of the VCLT, 
since the fundamental requirements for using such supplementary 
means (whether in the confirmatory or determinative sense) to derive 
meaning are all wanting in the particular case of Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Teleological scrutiny of the full compass of 
investment protections and treaty objectives in the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT also yields an additional argument against the use of the 
customary defense of “necessity” to interpret Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. 
The consequences to forcing the customary defense of 
“necessity” into Article XI interpretation are not only legal.  Policy 
and governance issues both pose countervailing considerations to 
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this form of interpretation.  Uncertainty in ICSID Tribunals’ 
interpretations of the same treaty provision undermines investor 
and host State confidence in the reliability of the dispute settlement 
procedures available in the international investment regime, and 
could likely deter recourse to binding arbitration when there is a 
higher perception of unpredictability of legal outcomes.317  
Investors undertaking cost-benefit analyses could be incentivized 
by this perception of poor recovery from litigation to precipitately 
pull out (capital or financial) investments altogether at the first 
signs of economic or financial crisis in the host State, instead of 
agreeing to alternative forms of restructuring (such as writing off 
distressed debt, corporate reorganizations, among others).318  
Increased volumes of capital flight, in turn, could plunge a host 
State into an even deeper and longer economic crisis than initially 
projected.319 
At the same time, attaching an Article 25-type meaning 
(customary defense of “necessity”) to Article XI-type non-
precluded measures (and coupled with a Continental-like 
interpretation that non-preclusion would mean that no breach 
would ever arise from the bilateral investment treaty), itself creates 
a moral hazard for the conduct of host States in relation to 
investment treatment and protection.  If permissively-worded BIT 
clauses on non-precluded measures (e.g. “This Treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary . . . .”) could suffice to cavalierly dispose of a host State’s 
substantive obligations under the BIT, host States might 
conceivably relax the necessary diligence in corporate governance 
and investment protection at its own timeline, or for so long as the 
host State deems that its economy is in a “state of economic 
emergency” (or at the very least, presents macroeconomic 
indicators to reasonably support its economic judgment). 
 
317 See Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297, 
302–16 (2005). 
318 See Molly Zohn, Filling the Void: International Legal Structures and Political 
Risk in Investment, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 230, 282–83 (2007) (concluding that 
factors external to host countries greatly affect political risk within host countries, 
and thus investors have incentives to foster new mthods of host country control). 
319 See CAPITAL FLIGHT AND CAPITAL CONTROLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2005) (presenting case studies of capital flight in countries 
including South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil). 
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Can the customary defense of “necessity” ever transform the 
content of the conventional law on non-precluded measures?  
Additionally, given the contemporary legal regime governing 
international investment, is there still room for host States to plead 
“essential security interests”? 
Answering both questions still requires adherence to the 
unitary system of interpretation under the VCLT.  While the 
restrictive minority view on treaties states that the meanings of 
treaty norms could progressively incorporate subsequent 
“evolutionary” customary law development on the same subject 
matter,320 it is difficult to draw this inference given the specific 
textual formulation of Article XI alongside the entire structural 
design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  Thus, insofar as host State 
obligations to investors are concerned, the U.S.-Argentina BIT itself 
provided for delimitations that already contemplated and factored 
in political risk, and expressly segregated instances when 
substantive protections would not apply.  This rationale 
powerfully dovetails with the sole arbitrator’s conclusions in the 
May 4, 1999 Final Award in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. 
Republic of Indonesia, where a host State’s liability for compensating 
a foreign investor was upheld notwithstanding the pleaded 
defense of deleterious consequences from the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis: 
Parties entering into international contracts cannot claim 
unawareness of the risks of macro-economic adversities.  
Their effects may be extreme, but are nonetheless within 
the contemplation of the signatories.  Moreover they are in 
the contemplation of financiers who evaluate the reliability 
of borrowers on the strength of contractual undertakings; 
and as they are in the contemplation of insurers who assess 
their willingness to provide cover to investors who also rely 
on such undertakings. 321 
The same rationale, however, may not be said to apply for the 
use of Article XI as between States Parties to the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT.  With respect to legal obligations (whether arising from treaty, 
 
320 NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT 
OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1995). 
321 Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik 
Negara (Berm. v. Indon.), Award, 14 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. A-1, ¶¶ 411–13 
(May 4, 1999). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
934 U. Pa. J. Int’l. L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
customary international law, or general principles of international 
law) under the structure of state responsibility in general 
international law, States cannot be reasonably expected to hedge 
against political risks in the way investors and host States do.  At 
best, States Parties to bilateral investment treaties could only 
expect adjustments in their relative claims and mutual expectations 
in relation to responsibilities to each other if they foresaw that 
either could, at a point in time, apply such “necessary measures.”  
This is all the “comfort” that Article XI could provide to States 
Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, without doing violence to the 
VCLT’s unitary system of interpretation as was done in the 
Continental Award. 
In this sense, “necessity” can be conceptually disaggregated—
there is “necessity” which a government employs within its 
domestic legal order (as in legislative exercises which justify 
measures in relation to domestic constituents on the grounds of the 
ordre publique or orden publico); “necessity” which a government 
applies to condition and adjust citizens’ expectations in relation to 
how the state apparatus is deployed to affect individual or 
constitutional rights in emergency cases; and there is “necessity” 
which is res inter alios acta for investors enjoying contractual rights, 
but is permissibly raised among and between States in the 
international legal order.  The treaty-applier’s task of making these 
distinctions is imperative to avoid the kind of confusion seen from 
the stream of Article XI cases from Sempra to Continental. 
Certainly, future bilateral investment treaties could stipulate 
further detail on the legal effects of non-precluded measures, and 
countries are well within their rights if they decide to include a 
Continental-like interpretation of non-preclusion into the treaty 
text.  However, unless it is clear from the treaty’s text, context, 
subsequent agreement or practice, or relevant rules of international 
law as specified in the treaty or intended by the parties to the 
treaty, the radical interpretation undertaken by the Continental 
Tribunal should not be read into existing bilateral investment 
treaty regimes.  It is for parties to bilateral investment treaties to 
negotiate and provide for these specific legal consequences to non-
precluded measures, and not for vacillating tribunals with opaque 
interpretive methodologies. 
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